Ancient Skepticism
Ancient Skepticism East and West
The concept of skepticism originates in ancient Greek philosophy, specifically in relation to the Academic Skeptics, who saw themselves as successors to Plato's Academy, and the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, who traced their ideas back to Pyrrho of Elis. In contrast to skepticism in modern Western philosophy (in the tradition of Descartes), both schools designed their views as a way of life, which was typical of ancient philosophy as a whole. In this regard, there is an interesting parallel to the ancient philosophies of India and China.
Regarding skepticism, however, the similarities do not end there. A whole network of commonalities emerges, particularly between Pyrrhonian skepticism—as most clearly represented by Sextus Empiricus—the interpretation of Taoism in Zhuangzi, and Buddhism according to Nāgārjuna. A wide range of arguments can be found in several of these traditions. Furthermore, similarities appear in the conception of skepticism itself, such as the idea that there are multiple levels of truth, or the handling of the accusation that skepticism is self-contradictory. These similarities may well be rooted, at least in part, in historical connections, such as Pyrrho’s stay in India. Regardless, due to the conceptual proximity of these traditions alone, we should use the term "ancient skepticism" to describe the skeptical elements of all three traditions, rather than applying it solely to Western antiquity.
In addition to the conceptual overlaps, the differences are also of interest. These consist, for one, in the textual form: Sextus writes in the form of a philosophical treatise, Nāgārjuna in the form of verses, and Zhuangzi in a more literary style, rich in parables and stories. Moreover, a kind of deeper insight is hinted at in Nāgārjuna and Zhuangzi, whereas Sextus merely reports that he has (apparently) had good experiences with the skeptical way of life. Another difference appears to lie in the role of the skeptic in society: while Sextus tends to recommend behaving in accordance with prevailing customs and laws, Zhuangzi aims for a different, freer social order in which all people can behave according to their respective natures. These differences are particularly interesting because they allow the various traditions to mutually enrich one another.
Tammo Lossau
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