

Space and Time for Traffic Manoeuvres

Ernst-Rüdiger Olderog
Christopher Bishopink

Festkolloquium for Jan Peleska
3 March 2023



Project [UniForM Workbench](#) 1995–98 [KPOB99]:


- ▶ Bernd Krieg-Brückner
- ▶ Jan Peleska
- ▶ Ernst-Rüdiger Olderog
- ▶ Alexander Baer, Elpro LET Berlin

Part of project contents:

- ▶ Application area: [railway control for trams](#)

UniForM Workbench: Bremen + Oldenburg + **Elpro AG**

Komponenten des DESI



Collaboration with Jan

Project [UniForM Workbench](#) , 1995–98 [KPOB99]:

- ▶ Bernd Krieg-Brückner
- ▶ Jan Peleska
- ▶ Ernst-Rüdiger Olderog
- ▶ Alexander Baer, Elpro LET Berlin

Part of project contents:

- ▶ Application area: [railway control for trams](#)
- ▶ programming language ST dedicated for Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs).
- ▶ Henning Dierks introduced [PLC-Automata](#) [Die01]: formal semantics amenable for real-time model checking

From Trains to Cars: The Challenge

Cooperation with [Anders P. Ravn](#) , Aalborg University.

Prove [safety \(collision freedom\)](#) of
traffic manoeuvres on different types of roads.


From Trains to Cars: The Challenge

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motorways:

Hilscher, Linker, O. and Ravn [HLOR11]




From Trains to Cars: The Challenge

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country roads:

Hilscher, Linker and O. [HLO13]




From Trains to Cars: The Challenge

Cooperation with [Anders P. Ravn](#), Aalborg University.

Prove **safety (collision freedom)** of traffic manoeuvres on different types of roads.

urban crossings:



Safety is hybrid system verification problem:

car dynamics + car controllers + assumptions \models safety

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Collision freedom is a **spatial property**.

Our approach is based on

spatial logic + abstract controllers

hiding car dynamics.

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
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
Dedicated **Multi-lane Spatial Logic** inspired by work in ProCoS:

- ▶ Interval temporal logic Moszkowski [Mos85]
- ▶ Duration Calculus Zhou, Hoare and Ravn [ZHR91]



Preliminaries:

- ▶ Car identifiers globally unique: A, B, \dots
Set of all car identifiers: \mathbb{I}
- ▶ Infinite road (\mathbb{R})
- ▶ Lanes: $\mathbb{L} = \{0, \dots, N\}$



A **traffic snapshot** is a structure $\mathcal{TS} = (res, clm, pos, spd, acc)$, where

- ▶ $res/clm : \mathbb{I} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{L})$: set of lanes each car reserves/claims,
- ▶ $pos/spd/acc : \mathbb{I} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$: position/speed/acceleration of each car.

Transitions

$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mathcal{TS}'$ for an action α of the following type:

$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{t} \mathcal{TS}'$ time passes

$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{\text{acc}(C,a)} \mathcal{TS}'$ accelerate


$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{c(C,n)} \mathcal{TS}'$ claim

$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{\text{wd}_c(C)} \mathcal{TS}'$ withdraw claim

$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{r(C)} \mathcal{TS}'$ reserve

$\mathcal{TS} \xrightarrow{\text{wd}_r(C,n)} \mathcal{TS}'$ withdraw reservation

Local View



View $V = (L, X, E)$, where

- ▶ L subinterval of \mathbb{L} ,
- ▶ X subinterval of \mathbb{R} ,
- ▶ $E \in \mathbb{I}$ identifier of car under consideration.

Multi-lane Spatial Logic with Scopes

Fränzle, Hansen and Ody [FHO15]

MLSLS: Syntax

Car variables: c, d and special variable ego

Formulae φ


$\varphi ::= true \mid c = d \mid free \mid re(c) \mid cl(c) \mid \ell = k$ (atoms)

$\mid \neg\varphi_1 \mid \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \mid \exists c : \varphi_1$ (FOL)

$\mid \varphi_1 \frown \varphi_2 \mid \begin{array}{l} \varphi_2 \\ \varphi_1 \end{array} \mid cs : \varphi_1$ (chop and scope)


Somewhere: $\langle \phi \rangle \equiv true \frown \begin{pmatrix} true \\ \phi \\ true \end{pmatrix} \frown true$

Example : Collision check




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
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$\langle re(ego) \wedge re(c) \rangle$

Somewhere: $\langle \phi \rangle \equiv true \frown \begin{pmatrix} true \\ \phi \\ true \end{pmatrix} \frown true$

Example : Collision check




$\langle re(ego) \wedge re(c) \rangle$

$cc \equiv \exists c: c \neq ego \wedge \langle re(ego) \wedge re(c) \rangle$

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Example : Collision check





$cc \equiv \exists c: c \neq ego \wedge \langle re(ego) \wedge re(c) \rangle$

Safety from ego's perspective: $\neg cc$

Potential collision

Claim of another car C overlaps with E 's own reservation or claim:



$$pc'(ego) \equiv \exists c : c \neq ego \wedge \langle cl(c) \wedge (re(ego) \vee cl(ego)) \rangle$$

The syntax of SCL formulae ψ is as follows:

$$\psi ::= p \mid \neg\psi \mid \psi_1 \vee \psi_2 \mid \psi_1 \mathcal{U} \psi_2 \mid \psi_1 \mathcal{S} \psi_2 \mid \psi \triangleleft_{\sim c} \mid \triangleright_{\sim c} \psi,$$

where p ranges over propositional symbols and $\sim \in \{<, \leq, =, \geq, >\}$.


- ▶ **State history operator** $\psi \triangleleft_{\sim c}$ specifies that the time since ψ held at last must satisfy $\sim c$.
- ▶ **State prophecy operator** $\triangleright_{\sim c} \psi$ specifies that the time until ψ holds next must satisfy $\sim c$.

Models of SCL formulae are sets of **timed sequences of states**.

SC Automata : a variant of Timed Automata with

- ▶ a history clock x_p and a prophecy clock y_p

for each proposition p .



Properties:

SC Automata **accept** the timed sequences of states that satisfy SCL formulae.

E.g. $Clg \rightarrow \triangleright_{<2} Dn$

$Dn \rightarrow \triangleleft_{\geq 1} Up$

SC Automata are **complementable** and language inclusion decidable.

We combine SCL and MLSLS by **instantiating** the uninterpreted propositions p of SCL with **MLSLS formulae** .


Example :

$$\varphi = \langle pc'(ego) \rangle \rightarrow \triangleright_{<2} \neg \langle pc'(ego) \rangle$$


SC Automata can be used to accept TMSL formulae.
We employ them as **monitors** for such formulae.

Example: Planned Lane Change

Consider the following traffic snapshot:




- Car A has a monitor for $\varphi = \langle pc'(ego) \rangle \rightarrow \triangleright_{<2} \neg \langle pc'(ego) \rangle$:



Example: Planned Lane Change

Consider the following traffic snapshot:



- ▶ Car A has a monitor for $\varphi = \langle pc'(ego) \rangle \rightarrow \triangleright_{<2} \neg \langle pc'(ego) \rangle$.
- ▶ Plan of car E for near future:

$$\omega = \langle (c(E, 2), 3.5), (r(E), 8) \rangle$$


- ▶ Car E broadcasts this plan to neighbouring cars.

Supervisor in car A

Car A receives plan of E for near future

$$\omega = \langle (c(E, 2), 3.5), (r(E), 8) \rangle$$

via $com?\omega$ of the negotiation transitions of its supervisor




which **checks** it using its monitor for φ .

Timely resolution

Car A receives plan of E: $\omega = \langle (c(E, 2), 3.5), (r(E), 8) \rangle$

Supervisor in car A performs *check*(ω) :




It leads to **potential collision** $\langle pc'(A) \rangle$ at time 3.5

that is **resolved** after 0.25 time units.

So supervisor finds satisfaction of ϕ and broadcasts *allow!*(A, ω) .

Controller \mathcal{C} , here in car E

Plan of E : $\omega = \langle (c(E, 2), 3.5), (r(E), 8) \rangle$




Here car A broadcasts $allow!(A, \omega)$.


Thus E can execute its plan.

Terminology

- ▶ **Monitor** \mathcal{A}_φ : SC Automaton for checking a TMLSL formula φ
- ▶ **Supervisor (Enforcer)** \mathcal{A}'_φ :
monitor \mathcal{A}_φ enriched with negotiating transitions



- ▶ **Controller** \mathcal{C} :



Checking a sequence of actions

Consider the monitor \mathcal{A}_φ for the TMLSL formula φ .

Given a sequence of actions ω up to a time bound t with $\mathcal{TS}_0 \xrightarrow{\omega} \mathcal{TS}$.

Question: Does $\mathcal{TS}_0, \omega \models_t \varphi$ hold ?

Lemma

For $l \in L_0$ with $\mathcal{TS}_0 \models \mathcal{L}(l)$ the following holds:

check($\mathcal{TS}_0, l, \omega$) = true
{by def.} iff $\exists l' \in \text{locset}(\mathcal{A}_\varphi, \mathcal{TS}_0, \omega) \wedge l' \notin \text{bad}$
iff $\mathcal{TS}_0, \omega \models_t \varphi$.

Theorem

For every finite timed state sequence $m \in L(\mathcal{A}'_\varphi \parallel \mathcal{C})$ up to time t there is a finite timed word of actions ω up to time t such that

- ▶ ω has been successfully checked by the enforcer \mathcal{A}'_φ ,
- ▶ the states in m describe the evolution of \mathcal{TS}_0 along ω ,
- ▶ ω and \mathcal{TS}_0 are a model of φ up to time t ,
in symbols: $TS_0, \omega \models_t \varphi$.

Timed sequences of actions and states :

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 \omega : & TS_0 & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_0, t_0)} & TS_1 & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_1, t_1)} & TS_2 & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_2, t_2)} \dots \xrightarrow{(\alpha_{n-1}, t_{n-1})} & TS_n \\
 m : & \pi & & \pi & & \pi & & \uparrow \\
 & s_0 & & s_1 & & s_2 & & t
 \end{array}$$

Completeness

Theorem

Every finite timed word of actions ω with $\mathcal{TS}_0, \omega \models_t \varphi$ satisfies

$$m(\mathcal{TS}_0, \omega) \in L(\mathcal{A}'_{\varphi, L'_0} \parallel \mathcal{C}),$$

where $L'_0 = \{l \in L_0 \mid \mathcal{TS}_0 \models \mathcal{L}(l)\}$.

Timed sequences of actions and states :

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \omega : & TS_0 & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_0, t_0)} & TS_1 & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_1, t_1)} & TS_2 & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_2, t_2)} & \dots & \xrightarrow{(\alpha_{n-1}, t_{n-1})} & TS_n \\ m : & \pi & & \pi & & \pi & & & & \uparrow \\ & s_0 & & s_1 & & s_2 & & & & t \end{array}$$

Conclusion

We presented an approach for autonomous cars on motorways

- ▶ to check their manoeuvre plans for the near future before carrying them out,
- ▶ based on a combination of a spatial and a timed logic.

Future work:

- ▶ Planning beyond a time bound t ?
- ▶ How to arrive at the manoeuvre plans ?
- ▶ Other types of roads.

Dear Jan,

Congratulations

to your achievements in







applying mathematical rigour to real practical problems!

All the best for your future!

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