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French Republicanism in Algeria:

"Citoyen-Colon" versus

"Sujet-Musulman-Français"

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Vorwort

Seit der Französischen Revolution haben etliche Theoretiker den französischen republikanisch-universalen Staatsbürgerbegriff als ein Instrument der politischen Homogenisierung aufgefaßt. In dieser Studie soll gezeigt werden, daß er in Algerien keinesfalls als homogenisierender Faktor gewirkt, sondern vielmehr den Moslems die elementarsten Rechte verweigert hat. Er hat damit zur "Subjection" der einheimischen Bevölkerung beigetragen und in den französischen *départements* Algeriens die Zweiteilung in französischen Bürger oder *citoyen-colon* auf der einen Seite und französischen Untertan oder *sujet français musulman* auf der anderen Seite hervorgebracht.

Algerien veranschaulicht die Diskrepanz zwischen Theorie und Praxis der französischen Staatsbürgerschaft und liefert ein extremes Beispiel für die Unfähigkeit Frankreichs, die volle Staatsbürgerschaft auch jenen Gruppen zu verleihen, die sich weigern, nicht nur ihr öffentliches Leben, sondern auch ihre Privatsphäre französischer Kontrolle zu unterwerfen. Parallel dazu erhielten die algerischen Juden die französische Staatsbürgerschaft, indem sie - auf Druck der jüdischen Gemeinde Frankreichs - das französisch-jüdische Konsistorium anerkannten und somit ihr öffentliches und einen Teil ihres privaten Lebens der französischen Gesetzgebung unterwarfen.

Die Zweideutigkeit des universalistischen Prinzips in der französischen Staatsbürgerschaft belastet die französische Regierung angesichts der multikulturellen französischen Gegenwartsgesellschaft bis heute. In Algerien hatten die Verweigerung elementarer Rechte für Mosleme und der Kampf um eine allgemeine Säkularisierung unter französischer Herrschaft tiefgreifende Folgen für den unabhängigen algerischen Staat, in dem Säkularisierung und Modernisierung sich einen unerbittlichen Kampf liefern mit einem religiösen Extremismus, dessen Ziel die totale Unterordnung des privaten und öffentlichen Lebens unter religiöse Kontrolle ist.

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Abstract

Since the Revolution, the French republican universal concept of citizenship has been characterized by some theorists as an instrument of political egalitarian homogenization from above. This paper shows that in Algeria the French concept of citizenship was not a factor of homogenization and the most fundamental rights were denied to the Muslims, contributing to the "subjection" of the native population and giving rise in the French *départements* of Algeria, to the dichotomy of the French citizen, the *citoyen-colon*, and the French subject, the *sujet français musulman*.

Algeria furnishes a demonstration of the gap between the theory and practice of French citizenship, and is an extreme example of France's inability to extend full citizenship to those groups that refused to relinquish to French control not only their public sphere but also their private sphere. In a parallel move, under the strong influence of French Jewish society, the Algerian Jews were admitted to French citizenship, recognizing the rule of the French Jewish Consistory, when they submitted their civil and a part of their private life to French regulation.

The ambiguity of the universalist principle concerning French citizenship still haunts the French administration today in a French multicultural society. The denial of fundamental rights to Muslims and the battle for secularization during French rule, have also important consequences on the newly independent country of Algeria, where secularization and modernization are at war with a religious extremism that attempted to put the private and civil spheres of society under full religious control.

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1. Introduction

Since the Revolution, the French republican universal concept of citizenship has been characterized by some theorists as an instrument of political egalitarian homogenization from above. This paper sets out to examine how in Algeria the French concept of citizenship was not a factor of homogenization (political, social or economic) but an instrument to modify the structure of the indigenous society, contributing to the "subjection" of the native population and creating in the French *départements* of Algeria, a de facto two level society: the French citizen, the *citoyen-colon*, and the French subject, the *sujet français musulman*.¹ How did that republican dichotomy happen?

It was in the name of *Laïcité*² that the Republicans of the French Third Republic effected the colonization of various peoples. *Laïcité* represented the ascent of reason and rationality as it protected individual and collective rights against religious arbitrariness. It was the primary legitimizing principle of the Republic, and as such, it united France (the Metropolis) for several generations. The antinomy that would unfold in the colony, however, was between the dou-

¹ *Sujet français musulman* was the official terminology printed on all the official papers (birth certificate, identity card, passport etc.) of the majority of native Algerians until the end of colonization after World War II. The Algerians who were granted French naturalization and who accepted it were no more than 15,000 in a population of 8 million indigenous people.

² Born during the Revolution, modern concepts of *laïcité* and anti-clericalism developed during the last decade of the nineteenth century. After 1850, families of words were created around the theme of irreligion, atheism, and anti-religion. The *Littre* ignored the word anti-clericalism but considered its antonym, clericalism, a neologism expressing the will to subordinate the temporal authority to the spiritual one. The *Littre* dictionary used the term *laïcité* to mean the opposite of clericalism. Before the nineteenth century, the term *laïc* (lay) defined someone who was neither a priest nor a religious person. In nineteenth century usage, *laïc* became a person or an institution opposing clerics in their ambition to control the functioning of civil society. These two families of words and their meanings cannot be translated directly into English, since polemics have broadened their meanings past their original context. It is in this extension of these words that the ambiguity lies in that for the faithful during the late nineteenth century and after, the anti-clerical, the *laïc*, became the enemy who pretends to limit the political role of the Church, but who actually wants to destroy Church power as a whole. For the *laïc* the Church in alliance with the royalists aimed at the destruction of the Republic and its egalitarian principles it claimed to represent; the Church and the faithful were the enemies. In anti-clericalism as well as in *laïcité* there are, therefore, both a doctrinal and a political content. Mayeur (1975):143-144.

ble project of making Algeria into a settler colony on the one hand, and of promoting Republican *laïc* values on the other. The settlers/*colons* would replicate in Algeria their own political divisions imported from metropolitan France. This essay will concentrate on the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, a period of extremely rich intellectual history in France (colonization, the establishment of secular compulsory education, universal male suffrage debates, etc.). For it was during this period that France became a Metropolis and sought to impose its Republican ideology upon the three newly acquired departments of which the Algerian territory was composed.

Algeria's uniqueness lies in the fact that for one hundred and thirty years it was the only Arab country which, under the domination of a world power, in this case France, became a *colonie de peuplement*/settler colony. A settler colony necessarily brings with it a politics of discrimination toward the indigenous people. This type of colony delimited European zones from mixed ones with a majority of indigenous residents. The relocation of indigenous people, viewed by Europeans as being too numerous, to poorer regions, especially from the coastal regions, often left these populations with nowhere to turn. Having been dispossessed of their homes, values, customs, norms and institutions, these people offered only minimal resistance. The uniqueness among Arab societies of this stifling relationship with France/the colonial power has had a profound and still under-estimated influence on the formation of Algerian nationalism. By the time Independence was achieved, colonization had already profoundly and lastingly transformed the human landscape of Algeria.

By revisiting the Algerian colonial experience, some of the more significant conflicts which arose from it can be located. While it would be going too far to suggest that all of the violence expressed today in Algerian society is a direct consequence of colonization, it is not far-fetched to claim that colonization did play an important role in engendering the conflicts from which this violence springs. However, is not the focus of this paper and only a longer, and more detailed study than this could determine in what form and proportion the colonial period influenced the politico-religious problems of Algeria today.

2. From the Conquest to the Third Republic

According to the vast majority of French historical studies documented between 1830 and 1962, Algeria, before it was colonized, had no history of its own. Rather, a schematic vision developed that tended to represent Algeria as a land without particular antecedents, without authenticity, without autonomy, and as a place perpetually enslaved. Carthaginians, Romans, Byzantine Vandals,

Arabs, Turks and the French: all were successive masters of the geographic ensemble situated in the centre of North Africa which the natives could never elevate to an independent collectivity.³ During colonization, Algerians were never more than sporadic historical subjects: excitable aids to the French during colonial and world wars. They would become subjects of their own history only at the time of the Algerian War, and after Independence.

Following the conquest of Algeria by France in June of 1830, a military regime governed the country until 1845.⁴ The political, social and economic power of the military would, however, endure throughout the colonial period over a large part of the territory.⁵ Unlike other French administrative colonies or *colonies d'encadrement*, Algeria represented a settler colony, which gave it a unique status among the French colonies. From 1845, France would advance a policy of administrative assimilation, splitting Algeria into provinces containing civil lands subjected to the same regime as those of France.⁶ This administrative organization, comparable to that of the Metropolis, was reinforced under the Third Republic, when Algeria was declared an integral part of France.

Although not without difficulty, the French government encouraged colonists to move to Algeria. Meanwhile, French policy regarding Algeria fluctuated according to the hazards of French domestic politics, regime changes in the Metropolis, the influence of colonial pressure groups in Paris and in Algeria, and the arrival from France of exiled members of the political opposition as well as voluntary immigrants to Algeria.

During colonization, two distinct populations made up Algeria, each with its own language, religion, traditions and mores. While at the conquest of Algeria in July 1830 France had made the commitment to respect the religious and family Islamic law, the successive French regimes enforced an assimilation policy toward the Muslim population in the administrative, economic and judicial domains.

The alienation of land began very early in Algeria. The struggle against *Abd*

3 In reality, these occupations were never complete, neither in time nor in territory, like that of France. Much of the territory remained free.

4 This conquest happened in the midst of a political crisis; Charles X was overthrown soon after the fall of Algiers, and his regime was replaced by the July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe.

5 The Colonial period of Algeria can be divided into three broad periods: organization (1830-1900), politics of association (1900-1956), and finally integration (1956-1962).

6 A bureau of civil affairs was created in each province and the law of the metropole was enforced. The towns were given municipal councils made up of Muslim, Israeli or foreign councilmen.

al-Qadir, for example, was a pretext to confiscate additional territories. These lands fell first to the colonial administration, then, through its machinations, into the hands of colonists.⁷ The Second Republic allowed temporary European claimants to become permanent proprietors, and relaxed the laws covering these new concessions.⁸

The Napoleonic Empire marked a return to a military regime and an autonomous policy toward Algeria, without ever returning to many of the administrative assimilation measures previously adopted.⁹ During this period, an elite group of the army, as well as the Saint-Simoniens, attempted to understand the indigenous culture of the Muslim population. In addition, maintenance of the occupation was accompanied by geographic surveys, early efforts at ethnographic description, as well as historical reconstruction.¹⁰ Napoleon III formulated the idea: "Algeria is not, formally speaking, so much a colony as an 'Arab Kingdom.'" He thought that three types of territory could coexist in Algeria and that colonization could extend itself up to a certain point, reinforcing itself within established borders. Further on, the "Arab Kingdom" allowed the interests of indigenous peoples to be safeguarded and it let them control their own lands. This colonial division, which varied the intensity of the colonial hold on the Algerian territory, would predetermine, in its structure and historic dynamics, the evolution of Algerian nationalism.

Unfortunately, Napoleon III's vision of the "Arab Kingdom" translated into contradictory measures regarding the citizenship and property rights of Muslims. Concerning citizenship, a distinction relating to religious and family Islamic law was introduced between citizens and non-citizens. The language of this edict, *Sénatus-Consulte*, served as the foundation for the policy of Algerian "subjection" which would last until 1946.¹¹ Napoleon III recognized the

⁷ In 1844 and 1846 two ordinances allowed the sale of *habous*, the legitimation of settlers without titles to the lands they occupied, and the appropriation of traditional thoroughfares under the pretext that they were not cultivated.

⁸ The Second Republic tried to export a large number of agricultural workers in order to populate Algeria and also to serve as safety valve for the social tensions and unemployment in France. These experiments were largely failures.

⁹ In 1858, Napoleon III abolished the position of General Governor of Algeria. He reestablished it two years later. In the territorial departments, civil Arab bureaus, with the same function as the military Arab bureaus, were created.

¹⁰ These first actors of the Algerian colonization were not systematically unfavorable toward the Muslim populations. Even if the Saint Simonien, the military and bureaucratic investigations were directly utilitarian, bureaucratic or political, they showed a spirit of observation, a desire to know the indigenous culture. However, Napoleon III's politics did not stop the appropriation of indigenous land.

¹¹ "The indigenous Muslim is French: nevertheless he would continue to be ruled

property rights of tribal peoples over the "territories over which they traditionally had permanent free reign." He would, however, demarcate tribal territory and divide these lands among the different *douars*¹² as well as those reserves of land which remained common.

In a parallel move, Napoleon III established individual property rights among the members of the *douars*. These measures disturbed the Muslim aristocracy by weakening the foundations of traditional tribal society. They provoked various troubles, including uprisings in Kabylia and among the Constantinois. The suppression of the *bureaux arabes*, (a colonial institution created at the beginning of the occupation of Algeria by the military to rule and protect the Muslim population) would result in yet another partitioning of territory into *communes*. Military territory came to be made up of *communes* shared by Muslims and Europeans, and *communes subdivisionnaires* which regrouped the tribes and the *douars*. State-held lands were put up for sale.¹³ Ultimately, these decisions would undermine the social fabric of various Muslim communities, depriving them of their structural foundations.

It was thus during the Second Empire that Algerian territory would be divided into three geographically distinct entities within which colonization would implant itself and exert a unique control over each indigenous population. Accordingly, there emerged three regions. In the North, a coastal band one hundred kilometers wide would contain the majority of the colony with its large European population, which, however, always remained less numerous than the indigenous population. Here, the control of the French Administration would be most pronounced, marked by a cultural, religious, political and economic "subjection" of indigenous peoples.

To the South of this band, there emerged a second strip, perhaps two or three hundred kilometers wide, which extended to the high plateaus. European domination was less present here, as was their direct control over Algerians. Finally, further South, was the Saharan region. During the colonial period, the few

by Muslim laws. He can be drafted, he can become a civil servant in Algeria. He can at his request be admitted [to citizenship] to enjoy the rights of French citizens; in that case he is ruled by the civil and political laws of France."

¹² In Algeria before the colonization, a *douar* was a regrouping of people living in tents, forming a community. The French colonizer used the term to divide Algeria administratively and so a *douar* became a rural division (comparable to a rural French *commune*). The *douar* became the basis of Algerian community organization.

¹³ In this situation, the important societies (among them, *la Société de l'Habra*, *la Macta*, *la Société générale algérienne*, and *la Société genevoise*) were better placed than the indigenous people or the colonists to acquire the best properties.

Europeans who were to be found there were mainly military personnel, who exercised little control over the nomadic populations of the area.

This geopolitical division of the territory, effected during the Second Empire, would last throughout the colonial period. The imposition of French language, property laws, religion, educational, fiscal and judicial systems, would vary, and would later result in two distinct resistance movements, each with its own variant of the anti-colonial struggle.

3. The Third Republic and *Laïcité* in Algeria

It was French republicanism, not French imperialism, which launched the colonial venture and successfully created the French colonial empire (later called *La Plus Grande France*). The colonial republican ideology focused on a universal assimilation of the colonized. The tendency of French colonization to assimilate the colonized both culturally and politically had its roots in the Revolution.¹⁴ The revolutionary convention abolished slavery and declared that all who lived in the colonies, irrespective of race, were French citizens with full rights. It also declared the colonies to be "integrated within the Republic and subject to the same law in Article 6 of the 1795 constitution."¹⁵ The question of how the existence of the colonies could be reconciled with the revolutionary principles of liberty and equality was resolved not by granting the colonized political autonomy or even independence, but by encouraging integration and assimilation. The revolutionaries saw themselves as the agents of a universally humanitarian and Republican creed which assimilated different races and ethnic groups by means of education, law and cultural influences and integrated them into the supra-national community.

The concept of assimilation was interpreted to mean integration of the colonies into the national territory. The colonies were potential overseas *provinces* which would obtain an administrative structure similar to that of the mother country and be subject to the same laws. The natives were, therefore, potential Frenchmen who would be integrated into the supra-national French civilization

¹⁴ Following the Revolution, the planters in the Antilles had obtained autonomy and sent representatives to the Estates-General. The constituent assembly included colonists, representatives of colonial trade, and reformers. This representation, however, would become a source of conflict between the natives and the French settlers, since the latter wanted control of the colony's representation and consequently fought to deny the natives political representation.

¹⁵ Von Albertini (1977:227).

irrespective of color, religion, or cultural traditions. They would be granted civil rights and be governed from Paris democratically through their own parliamentary representation.¹⁶ In effect, assimilation meant political integration and equality of status. Colonial assimilation policies implied, in principle, the promotion of "subjects" to full and equal citizenship.

Even though economic and political arguments were used by the government, the legitimacy of colonization was primarily defended on humanitarian grounds; the Republic would bring science, reason and freedom to underdeveloped societies. This idea was particularly attractive to nineteenth-century humanists, such as Ernest Renan, who believed that the practices of French civilization ought to prevail over the oppression of ancient ignorance and superstition. For these thinkers, colonialism meant emancipation. The civil service and the army were to serve as administrators, create peace, and work to achieve the Republic's mission to colonize these isolated populations in order to promote the universal values of the 1789 Revolution: liberty, fraternity and equality. Pro-colonists of the nineteenth century believed that it was France's task to modernize the colonies. Therein lay an ambiguity. While some pro-colonists were assimilationist and, therefore, did not foresee the independence of the colonies, others foresaw an end to colonization, though they were not explicit about the timing or the level of development required to achieve it. On its side, however, the Republic was readying itself to manage its new territories, advocating assimilation or a faraway independence for the colonized populations. In the 1870s, assimilationist or integrationist policies were not yet on the political agenda. It was left to the Third Republic to take up these problems. Throughout these years, the debate developing among pro-colonists rested on three grounds: economic agendas, political reflections and moral contentions.

In Algeria, in part due to the proximity to the Metropolis, and the easy access to a "somewhat large group of settlers," the French colonial policy was always impregnated by the domestic French policy, however Algeria was never considered completely as a part of French Metropolis, nor as a true colony. Algeria was a terrain of confrontation between pro-colonists on economic grounds and until World War II, the army as protector of the indigenous population.

In 1870, the Algeria of the military, along with the vision of an Arab Kingdom, would disappear with the fall of the Empire and the advent of the Third Republic. According to the colonists, these ideas constituted obstacles to a

¹⁶ There would be no self-government on the local level, as there was none in the departments of the Metropolis. The position of Governor General was maintained.

"complete" colonization and its programs. For the colonists their programs had to be implemented without hindrances in the complementary domains of politics and economics. The colonists wanted to express their power freely, as much in Paris as in Algeria. In Paris, political representatives, French colonists from Algeria, were active in all the assemblies. Their political project of creating a settler colony in an already-inhabited country faced a dilemma though, since this plan was only possible if the native people retreated in the face of a large wave of immigrants (which was never the case). In the colony, one witnessed the generalization of the departmental and communal framework, with its double strategy to create *communes* with full political power and others with mixed political power.¹⁷ In the South, as stated above, *les bureaux arabes* and the indigenous *communes subdivisionnaires* remained in existence under the control of the military.

In the North, through extremely exacting measures of the colonists and the French administration, the indigenous society was crushed. Land was confiscated or sold to the colonists. The tribes were dismantled and the aristocracy's power terminated. The submission of the Islamic judicial, legal and religious order to the colonial power was enforced.¹⁸

4. Property, a Revolutionary Concept

Regarding property rights, alliances formed between Republican colonists and conservatives. Pure Republicans sometimes adopted similar means to those the Catholic Church of Algiers had used to implement its divergent policy of proselytism. Unlike the metropolitan situation in France, there existed in Algeria a consensus among conservatives and Republicans regarding their mutual aversion to the Army. Republicans in Algeria wanted to deliver Algeria from the "Rule of the Sabre" and to institute a civil regime which fit more closely their anti-militarist ideology. This policy accorded with the aspirations of conservative colonists, for whom in their roles as managers of large tracts of territory and as the protectors of indigenous peoples the military represented an obstacle to development.

¹⁷ The civil territory was extended considerably, to include the fully integrated (*de plein exercice*) communes ruled by the French laws of 1884 and the mixed communes where only the French citizens were ruled by the French laws of 1884.

¹⁸ The Third Republic was unable to stop the illegal expropriations despite the law of 1851, which declared property inalienable, be it French, indigenous or foreign.

One crisis of this emerging conflict between colonist and the military occurred at the time of the uprisings in Kabylia (1871). Here, the military leaders were accused of reconciling the opposing parties in order to launch the insurrection, organizing the anticipated retreats, and coming to terms with the enemy - all of which served to make a military regime look indispensable. The policies and the management of *les bureaux arabes* by the military were called into question. The colonists' dislike of *les bureaux arabes* did not derive from the fact that they represented authority, but from the fact that they had been erected in defense of Muslims faced with colonization, and against the policy of *cantonement*. This policy promoted by the settlers advocated cantonment of the Muslim population in geographic areas designated by the settlers.

By 1871-1872, for the first time since the conquest of Algeria, the colonists were gaining power over the autonomy of the military, the protector of the interests of the indigenous society. However, this sense of revolutionary political justice maintained by the French of Algeria - while it fueled their resentments of the Army and shaped their conception of the future of Algeria - was maintained at the expense of the tribal peoples. The colonists did not wish to acknowledge the military tradition of the "belligerent." The tribal insurgents were judged to be communities rebelling against French authority. The "Republican Legality" invoked by the colonists became a repressive arm, strengthening the insurrection and leading to the sequestering of Kabyle territories. The French demands for war reparations, the confiscation of moneys and the dismantling of tribal societies achieved near unanimity in the Republican and Catholic press.

The sequestering of lands was further legitimized by French opinion: many expected Algeria to become the refuge for Alsacians and Lorraines who, having opted for French citizenship after the defeat of Sedan and the end of German control of these two provinces, sought lands in "Trans-Mediterranean France." In June of 1871, the National Assembly adopted a resolution charging local colonial authorities to locate 100,000 hectares of land to be turned over to Alsacians and Lorraines. This policy was supported by the Church in the person of Mgr. Lavignerie, Archbishop of Algiers, who dreamed of returning the "barbarian Muslim" population to the Christian civilization of their forefathers during the time of Saint Augustine and Tertullian. The Cardinal of Lavignerie thus pronounced himself ready to turn his mission into a policy which would break apart tribal and other traditional forms of indigenous social organization.

The Republicans found themselves facing a major dilemma: that of reconciling an egalitarian and humanitarian vocation with colonial exploitation. France had brought to Algeria an inalienable revolutionary value, namely, the concept of property ownership. On the one hand, it permitted an easing of the conscience in Paris, while on the other, it augmented the profit of colonists. The colonists themselves claimed to be the defenders of the democratic revolution-

ary values of metropolitan society - whether Jacobin or liberal. The colonists probed these Republican values, not to strictly apply the laws of France in Algerian territory, but because it enabled them to formulate policies which focused on the French in Algeria. Officially, the goal of Algerian policy had been the assimilation of its population to the French of the Metropolis. Under the Third Republic, colonists could take advantage of the vote and representation rights to press the Metropolis politically, especially to effect a policy of control and domination over the Muslim population.

The instruments of domination would reveal the contradictions between colonial power and the *laïc* Republican ideology. Judicially, the Muslims who kept their Islamic laws remained subjects; they were deprived of their political rights and submitted to the *regime de l'indigénat* (indigenous regime). A "special" jurisdiction for French Muslim subjects would be sanctioned by "special" punishments for "special" infractions. This rule of exceptions would not be completely abolished until 1944.¹⁹ The expulsion of indigenous peoples from their lands was the precondition for colonial implantation. Indeed the laws of the Republic permitted Europeans to secure vast expanses of land never previously available for acquisition.²⁰ In fiscal matters, an Arab tax, which would supposedly be used to "develop" the country, was collected exclusively from Muslims.²¹ In politics, Muslims remained in an inferior position, due to the creation and maintenance of a two-vote system (*système des deux collèges*).²²

Property laws promulgated under the Third Republic and the three preceding regimes - its fiscal definition, as well as its jurisdiction - would come to have

19 A law in March 1902 legalized repressive tribunals, special courts to judge crimes and misdemeanors committed by Muslims. These repressive courts were suppressed in 1931, the criminal courts in 1942, and special penalties in 1944.

20 The laws of 1873 and 1887 on land ownership allowed Europeans to acquire 400,000 hectares of Muslim land. The balance sheet drawn up by Ageron showed that nearly a million hectares were given to the settlers. Those in Algiers had succeeded in quadrupling their holdings during that time. By 1910 the Muslim population had lost seven million hectares, which the settlers and the French state shared. Ageron (1968)I:101.

21 The few Muslims who had acquired French citizenship were exempted from the Arab tax.

22 The two bodies of electors were equally represented in Parliament and in other high administrative assemblies (the Algerian assembly and the *Conseils généraux* and in the proportion of 3/5 and 2/5 in the local council of the fully integrated commune, *commune de plein exercice*. The second body had less than half, or 2/5th, of the seats, even though it represented eight million inhabitants, while the first body represented one million. The administration's interference in the elections of the second body in order to turn the Muslim electoral representation toward conservatism and anti-nationalism aggravated the inequality of the political structure.

very different consequences within the three zones defined at the beginning of colonization. By the turn of the 20th century, the Algerian economy was concentrated in the northern zone where, on the coastal plains, pre-colonial cities would grow and others would be erected. On annexed lands, modern agricultural techniques were employed and settlers began exporting from citrus orchards and vineyards. In the plains, colonial society would also build the industrial infrastructure of Algeria: railroads, electrical generators, roads, ports, etc. Europeans, numbering just over a million, lived among more than half of the total Algerian indigenous population. In the North, the Muslim population was composed mainly of peasants dispossessed of their land, agricultural workers, industrial wage-earners, petty merchants, and the unemployed. Throughout colonization, these two societies worked side by side, but always maintained unequal levels of power.

To the South, on the high plateau's lines which comprised the second and third zone of colonization, things were very different. The colonial establishment controlled large areas used for farming sheep and grain. The old, pre-colonial towns hosted relatively few Europeans. Their limited number scarcely affected the local population: the proletarianization of the indigenous people was, accordingly, less accentuated there. Thus the indigenous society of the high plateau region would partially escape the wave of colonization experienced in the coastal plains. This area would continue to be supported by the large local landholders whose lands and goods had remained *indivis habous*.²³ These Arabic-speaking elites had remained educated and had retained their traditional social position.

5. Citizenship and the Universal Republic

The assimilation policy was limited to European elements and indigenous Jews who were declared citizens by the Crémieux Decree of October 1870. The Decree was the continuation of a general integration movement of the French Jewish community initiated under previous regimes.²⁴ The Algerian Jewish community "had been prepared" for the eventuality of collective naturalization by the French Jewish society since the beginning of colonization.²⁵ Thus, at the time it

²³ The term *Habous* defines an indivisible property (building and land) belonging to a Muslim community. Before colonization its revenues provided education and subsidized religious affairs of a particular Muslim community.

²⁴ Cohen (1980).

²⁵ If the conquest of Algeria at first surprised the French Jewish community, which

was the case of a veritable colonization of Algerian Judaism by French Judaism.²⁶

However, the civil court of Algiers provoked a debate on the judicial inconsistency concerning the application of French statutes to Algerian Jews who retained their Judaic family laws (regarding questions of marriage and divorce), until then the marriage of Algerian Jews was not recorded. Consequently the civil court of Algiers decided that the delicate civil situation of Algerian Jews required the intervention of *les Conseils généraux* to solicit the naturalization of all of these subjects. In the meantime, the Algerian Jewish community presented a petition of 10,000 signatures to Napoleon III in 1860 during his trip to Algeria, demanding French naturalization. In 1864, during his second trip to Algeria, Napoleon III met officially with the Grand Rabbi Charleville, Head of the Consistory, and said: "I hope that soon all the Algerian Jews will become French citizens." The decree project, held up by Émile Olivier on March 8, 1870, envisioned the collective access of Jews to the status of citizens by abandoning their Judaic family laws. The *Sénatus-Consulte*, after pointing out to the government the insufficiency of a decree, recommended a *Conseil d'État*.²⁷

The Conservatives and the Army raised doubt about the possible effect of such a mass naturalization on the Muslim community. On March 18, 1870 an investigation was ordered into the Muslim community's potential reception of the measure and into the possible consequences. The finding was that it would make absolutely no impression upon Muslims. The three Prefects of Algeria were favorable to this measure, because it permitted the growth of the French population compared to the Muslims and justified the political and bureaucratic assimilation of Algeria to the Metropolis. The Prefect of Constantine held the position that: "The effect produced on the Muslim population is insignificant or null. The Muslims have long been accustomed to the kind of fusion that has been established between the French and the Israelis." The War Ministry and

began by not knowing what attitude to adopt toward the Algerian Jewish community, soon the Consistory decided to modernize the life style of the Algerian Jewish community, hoping to impose upon them new communal forms in the image of the French Jewish community. In 1842, while French colonial policy was being designed, two French Jews, Jacques Altaras and Joseph Cohen, were sent on an inspection tour of Algeria. They were condescending toward their coreligionists. They recommended that the Algerian Jews "be initiated into the principles of civilization," that they change their life style, and be forbidden to wear their traditional costume. The Consistory system was advised, and religious marriage not preceded by secular civil marriage was forbidden. It was believed that all of this would help integrate the Algerian Jewish community into the French population. Schwarzfuchs (1981).

²⁶ Schwarzfuchs (1980).

²⁷ Ansky (1950):34-35.

the Generals who were consulted in Algeria in 1870 were more divided on the subject. Some harbored anti-Semitic feelings, but the majority answered that the decree made no impression on the Muslim population since "the Muslim population knew that it was the Jews who were asking for naturalization."²⁸ In June 1870, the Governor, Mac-Mahon, recognized "the need and the urgency of collective naturalization," he reduced the decree to a single article referring to a collective naturalization which admitted no delay and no exception. Crémieux passed the decree through the Government without changing a word.

In 1871, the Conservative press in Algeria mobilized against the decree supported by part of the army. Crémieux, during the attacks at the National Assembly in May 1874, answered the accusation of being a dictator: "It is not I who made the Algerian Jews French citizens but Napoleon III by an Imperial decree ... I found the draft of such a decree in the Ministry of Justice's files, I had only to promulgate it."²⁹ The journals edited by the Republicans who had been deported to Algeria in large numbers after the Paris *Commune* (former *Communards*) organized a campaign in favor of this naturalization.³⁰

Meanwhile, the growing number of colonial settlers reinforced the power of the colonists who participated in the reproduction of the political and religious divisions of the Metropolis in Algeria. The difference between Algeria as a settler colony and other French colonies was that these divisions and their accompanying political stakes were integrated into domestic metropolitan politics. Accordingly, the religious/secular cleavages were magnified in Algerian politics, making the Republican policies toward Muslims chronically difficult to enact. Loathe to dissociate events in Algeria from those of France, Conservatives in Paris and Algiers blamed the Crémieux Decree for the 1871 Kabylia uprising and denounced Republican pro-Jewish policies.³¹ In attacking the Decree,

28 Ansky (1950):36-37.

29 Agéron (1968)I:14-16.

30 Ansky (1950):33.

31 Conservative elements in Paris and in Algiers would blame the Crémieux decree for the uprising in Kabylia in 1871. This fed a passionate polemic at the time. However, many historians refute this argument. The Conservatives in Paris argued that Crémieux had taken advantage of the dictatorial powers of the government of National Defense put in place after the defeat of Sedan in 1871, and that Crémieux imposed upon the national will a Decree designed to satisfy his coreligionists. Other factors have been advanced among them, the defeat of the French armies at Sedan and the chaos that reigned in Algiers following the Paris *Commune*, even though the uprising happened with Prussia, when France was again able to mobilize her troops. Agéron's explanation was that the indigenous, so slow to move, were not informed of the best time for the uprising. He also suggested that the delay could have been for other reasons, such as, for example, that the due date for the payment of the debts the Muslims had contracted during

Conservatives killed two birds with one stone: they blamed Republicans for the Algerian uprisings, and they denounced their pro-Jewish policies. Alarmed by the progressive integration of the French Jewish community, which had several members in the Republican camp, the Conservatives opposed the possible extension of these integration policies to Algerian Jews across the Mediterranean. However, their efforts failed and the members of the Algerian Jewish community at large became French citizens, enjoying full citizenship rights and becoming a part of the French settler society. It took time, but the French Jewish Consistory was successful in imposing French rule not only over the public life of the Algerian community but also over a part of its private life.

6. *Laïcité* and Education in Algeria

The protection of individual and collective rights -- the egalitarian and *laïc* principles of the Third Republic -- constituted, for the French in the Metropolis, the foundation of the Republican universal ideology. For Muslims in Algeria, these principles would serve to guarantee the rights of their colonizers and became the definitive symbols of political, economic and judicial "subjection." These departures from fundamental Republican values were even more pronounced in the educational system established in Algeria. For the Republicans, the educational system was a vital interest upon which depended the future of the Republic and of France. Algeria, itself a Republican entity consisting of three departments, was a settler colony where the European population promulgated discriminatory policies toward the indigenous peoples. In this context, at the heart of Republican *laïcité*, different educational standards were applied to the two populations, varying according to the different regions of colonial implantation.

Public instruction for Muslims, already well developed in 1830, had disintegrated during the period of the conquest.³² Directly and indirectly, French authorities would destroy the Muslim schools, which they considered to be ref-

the agricultural crises (the major famine of 1867-1870) would come due in the month of March. Agéron (1968)I: 13-20.

³² Pelissier de Saint-Arnaud testified that elementary schooling was at least as widespread in Algeria as in France though without the advantage of its printing presses. Koran schools taught reading and writing in most of the villages. Science, law and theology were taught in each province, in the *medersas* and *zaouïas* to a smaller number of students (seven to eight thousand). Agéron (1968)I:318.

uges of the Algerian resistance.³³ The Second Republic decided upon a policy which the Second Empire would follow. On the one hand, it created "Arabic-French schools"³⁴ which, with the support of the military,³⁵ would provide Muslim students with primary and secondary educations. On the other hand, the Second Republic did not completely ban private Muslim schools but put them under strict surveillance. Colonists from all sides would criticize the "Arabic-French schools." Conservative as well as Republican opinions rose against the instruction of Muslims, demanding the immediate closure of "Arabic-French schools."³⁶

Unlike other colonies, Algeria was the theater for confrontations over the anti-clerical campaign which raged in the Metropolis at the time - even if Gambetta had declared this campaign to be un-exportable to the colonies. The educational experiences of Kabylia illustrated the conflict between the educational

33 The decrees of 1830 and 1843, by placing religious buildings, (including mosques) and those of the *habous* into the administration for the "public domain," restricted the material resources available to public education, which had been provided free by the Koran schools. The Koran schools and the *medersas* were abandoned, except when the local population had the financial means to support them. In the tribal lands, the *zaouïas* close to the European centers were abandoned, others were demolished by the war and the manuscripts used for teaching were destroyed. Finally during the hostilities most of the Muslim teachers emigrated to the regions not yet conquered. Those who stayed on, without salaries or lodging, fell into poverty or confined their work to religious functions. The final blow came with the 1848 judgement that placed all the real property of the *habous* and *zaouïas* and all the religious schools under state control.

34 The educational policy of the empire had been influenced by the Saint-Simonien movement, which had many converts in the Army. For General Bugeaud, close to Ismaël Urbain, the education of the Muslim children was a political necessity. For him, the Muslims needed technical and agricultural schools, modernized *medersas* in the towns, and farm-schools in the tribal lands.

35 At the end of the Second Empire, the military had created a primary educational system which functioned through 36 "Arabic-French schools" where Arabic was taught in the morning and French in the afternoon. Two "Arabic-French high schools" were created in Algiers and Constantine and one school of arts and crafts for Muslim students in Fort-National. A teachers' college open to French and Muslim children was opened in 1865 in Algiers to train teachers for the "Arabic-French schools." Three *medersas* were built in Constantine, Tlemcen and Blida to train Muslim religious and judicial personnel, with both French and Muslim teachers. Though the Muslim families opposed these "Arabic-French schools" where religion was not taught, this educational policy had a certain success in the territory under the control of the Army, where Muslim students continued to attend school.

36 Republicans demanding the closure of the "Arabic-French schools" carried to Algeria the anti-clerical battle raging in the Metropole between congregationalists and *laïc* schools.

policies taken up by the Republicans, the views of colonists in Algeria, and the metropolitan anti-clerical battle. During the mid-1870s, a plan was forwarded by the Army to the Governor, whereby Kabyles would be indoctrinated in the French language.³⁷ The plan envisaged the elimination of both Koran and French Arab schools and the creation of communal French schools in the middle of Kabylia.³⁸ This startling idea gave rise to a push by Republicans in Algeria to create a new educational policy for Muslims, to which the Ferryst Republicans would attach their name.

During the same period, the governor granted the Cardinal de Lavigerie complete authority to open private schools in Kabylia. The Jesuits, always pioneers of evangelization, would open a school in Kabylia in 1873, and others would be opened by the Pères Blancs, a congregation created by the Cardinal de Lavigerie. This competition would primarily stimulate the zeal of local assemblies. While demanding the closure of "clerical" schools, the Algiers Council was unable to prevent a 1874 vote approving a special credit for the salaries of French instructors to be drawn from the obligatory payments of the *communes* in Kabylia. The battle lasted three years. By 1877, credit was eliminated, and the projects were abandoned in several *communes*. Finally, the Archbishop Lavigerie wrote to the governor: "The central government must take exclusive charge of these schools. They must not be dependent upon municipal administration. At stake is a higher interest, namely the assimilation of indigenous peoples."³⁹

The "Kabylophile" *laïcs* presumed that the demise of Koran education as well as the impossibility of converting the Kabyles to Christianity gave them good reason to hope for the success of the *laïc* schools they urgently wished to create. In addition, the Republican victory in France gave their Algerian counterparts the opportunity to intervene in this domain. Jules Ferry, the new Minister of Public Education, signed onto the project which would make resources available for primary education in Algeria, and ushered it through the Algerian High Council in 1878. The Director of Primary Education whom he

37 A colonel proposed to the Governor a plan to make the Kabyles more French: "a population that we have sought to make more Arab than French." He proposed closing the "Arabic-French schools" as well as the *zaouïas* and the creation in Kabylia of schools modelled on the French Republican communal schools.

38 The Governor announced in Paris that at the request of "Kabyle notables," he envisaged the creation of two or three French schools in Kabylia, which would be financed by the indigenous communes, and he affirmed that the notables had committed themselves.

39 In this letter, Lavigerie suggested the creation of school vouchers furnished by the state to the non-French students, so that their parents could send them to the schools of their choice.

sent to evaluate the situation in Algeria,⁴⁰ concluded that it would be impossible to entrust such a mission to either municipal authorities or to elected officials, as they were deemed to be too subject to local influences to appreciate the interests of indigenous peoples.⁴¹

At first, the attempt to implant *laïc* schools succeeded. Jules Ferry wanted to establish fifteen such schools directly linked to the Minister of Education, and offered to contribute up to three quarters of the anticipated costs of doing so. But because of the troubles the school issue stirred up in Algiers, the government was only able to create four "ministerial schools" in 1881. The instructors were to be experienced appointees with superior qualifications, all of whom had completed prior study of Kabyle language and culture.⁴²

Though the experiment with "ministerial schools" led by Jules Ferry and certain Republicans in Algeria was launched on a tide of enthusiasm, it would soon run aground. Some of the causes for this partial failure reside with the opposition encountered from the Kabyles themselves, others with the anti-religious ardor of administrators of the culturally mixed *communes* of Tizi-Ouzou. In effect, the construction of French schools was accompanied by the closure of the *zaouïa* and the Koran schools which still existed in the *communes* where ministerial schools were being established. By virtue of an 1880 Decree on the establishment of congregations, the government also closed the region's Jesuit schools.⁴³ In the face of these Republican advances, colonial conservative opinion rose up against Jules Ferry's experiment with "ministerial schools." Sympathetic administrators were forced to step down as various groups pressured the Ministry to renounce its plan and halt further construction of the schools. The conservative opposition was effective: by 1882 subsidies for the projects were suspended.

40 At the end of the inquiry Jules Ferry sent two high-ranking civil servants specialized in education. These envoys, influenced by the Ismaël Urbain's report and their own inquiry, reported that it was necessary to develop a school system for the indigenous population in Algeria.

41 The director, acting as if the "Arabic-French schools" under the control of the civil authority had ceased to exist legally, asked that the indigenous schools be reattached directly to the Ministry of Education.

42 These schools became popular in part because the Jesuit schools had been closed. Colonial opinions, chilled by the ministerial proceeding, fought and slowed down the Jules Ferry experiment. The superior council in Algeria, at first receptive to the suggestions of the Governor, opposed the school budgets giving large subsidies to communes, for the development of Muslim public education. The press echoed this process. In their words, "the Kabyl children went to school too much."

43 After the *ralliement* of the Church to the Republic, made from Algiers by Bishop de Lavignerie, his religious order, *les Pères Blancs*, replaced the Jesuits.

The mandatory education law of 1883 served as the weapon which would definitively destroy not only the French Arab schools, but also the ministerial schools of Kabylia, which had been taken over by the local authorities.⁴⁴ The directors themselves, often Conservative or Republican, approved of dismantling the schools. The 1886 law which established the structure of public and private primary education in France would only be applied in Algeria six years later.

Meanwhile, the majority of Europeans mobilized against the construction of schools for Muslim students. The Algerian High Council demanded that the Metropolis finance the construction of such schools from its own budget. In addition, it ruled that revenues from a four-cent additional Muslim tax, originally designated for the support of Muslim education, be turned over to the colony's general expense fund.⁴⁵

The education decree instituted, on a provisional basis, a special *Certificat d'étude* for Muslim students. This diploma, by certifying the completion of primary education, gave them access at the end of 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries to civil service. The distinction between the *Certificat d'étude* granted to indigenous students and the one given to French students would last from 1883 to 1942. In 1907, colonists prepared and implemented a plan for the education of Muslim students which served as an alternative to universal education in the French Republic. According to this alternative, inexpensive "auxiliary schools" were created in which Muslim students could receive "practical, pre-professional" training and basic French courses from retired civil servants (civil or military).⁴⁶

In the context of private education, the statute discriminated against institutions that taught Muslims in favor of those that taught Europeans. Private Muslim education was subject to special governmental authorization and control. This regime forbade the opening of private schools wherever public schools already existed, in effect preventing Muslims from gaining access to a higher quality of education in ecclesiastical or Koran schools.⁴⁷ Indeed, it was many

44 These schools were closed as soon as the towns took over their management. The students were transferred in French high schools and their number decreased. The *Conseillers Municipaux* voted to secularize the primary schools. The "Arabic-French schools" remained in existence in the territory under the control of the military, until their suppression in 1883.

45 An inquiry revealed that 102 schools for Muslim children should have been built with funds coming from the Metropolis but in fact only 75 existed. The Metropolis slowly stopped the funding.

46 Collot (1987):15-16.

47 This clause was true for the European institutions. However, the problem for the Muslim children was that the public education created barriers to their attending

years later that *laïc* and Republican education became available to Muslim students. In 1889, less than 2 percent of the eligible Muslim population received a primary education; in 1906, just over 4 percent; and in 1912, fewer than 5 percent.

In the name of Western civilization, the advent of reason and rationality in the face of Christian, Muslim or Jewish fanaticism, the extremist Republicans, *les rouges* (who had been banished by previous French governments to Algeria), would join their voice with that of the Conservatives in reclaiming control over the dissolution of Muslim schools.⁴⁸ It was not until 1944 that there was a weakening of legislation suppressing private Muslim institutions. Into the imbroglio of French educational policy in Algeria was added Muslim families' mistrust of French schools, whether Christian or *laïc*. The educational system made no concessions to the existence of Arabic.⁴⁹ The poor quality of education only prevented Muslims from gaining access to public functions and administrative positions. By limiting access to these positions, the Republic undermined the indigenous populations' collective ability to either defend their rights in the face of the French judicial machine or to launch an effective political struggle.⁵⁰

The scarce intellectual elite of Muslim Algeria, perhaps numbering a thousand people in 1914, having entered a liberal profession or accepted a position as a functionary, included well-read traditionalists and bilingual intellectuals. These well-read traditionalists from the southern regions were under military control but less influenced by colonization. They were often "secretly admired for their knowledge." Apart from a partial advance within some Kabyle villages where Republican and church schools had entered into competition, the education of Muslim Algerians was a failure at the beginning of the 20th century. This failure may in part be imputed to Muslim opposition, but it was certainly due in large measure to the contradictions of a Republic attempting to be universalist, citizen, and colonizer all at once. This Republican ambiguity manifested itself in Algeria in the colonial administration. The colonists, whether conservative or

school, or made them attend auxiliary schools, inferior to the French public schools.

48 The Jewish private schools had restrictions similar to the Muslim schools. However, the French public schools' doors were opened to Jewish children.

49 A decree asked for teaching in Arabic controlled by a compulsory exam in the commune where the Muslims had bilingual education. The application of this measure depended on the good will of the local and departmental civil authorities.

50 In 1899, 86 Muslims went to the high schools and college, 180 in 1905 and 386 in 1914. Agéron (1979)II:152-167.

Republican, supported the same policies toward Muslims to the same ultimate end: inferior education or no education in the urban and rural zones of the coastal region.

7. Separation of Church and State: The Algerian Exception

Before analyzing the pernicious consequences of the *laïc* Republican policies upon the different zones of Algeria, it is important to briefly revisit the religious policies of the Republic vis-à-vis Algerian Islam. Islam was the only religion present in Algeria prior to colonization. As such, it was closely bound up with the indigenous culture. Koran schools, one of the essential cultural foundations of pre-colonial Algerian culture, provided, as we have seen, free public religious education. Their disappearance from some regions, primarily the North, took along with it an important mechanism of cultural formation of the Muslim population. Its "subjection", above all in the North, would ultimately result in a mockery of the principle of the "separation of cults and the state" upon which *laïc* Republican ideology was based. The French government expected to manage Islam as a religion which one could not let be. In principle, the Muslim religious expenditures were supposed to be covered by the *habous'* revenues, which were administered by the *domaines*. Instead the *habous'* properties had been diverted by the bureaucracy to the colonists. Thus, their revenues steadily diminished year by year. After 1870, the state continued to alienate more and more *habous'* properties.

Secondly, since passage of the law of December 23, 1875, all personnel in registered mosques (of which only 100 imams and some 390 subaltern clergy ministered to some 3,500,000 faithful) were supposed to receive a salary from the *domaines*, to be drawn from the revenues of the *habous*. The *domaines'* policy, however, was to divert as little revenue as possible from the French administration.⁵¹ Algerian Muslims suffered badly under this regime, which official France believed to be quite liberal inasmuch as it allowed the free exercise of religion. In fact, the freedom of religious development had ceased and the most traditional of religious events, such as festivals and pilgrimages, were at the mercy of administrative authorization. The authorities, for example, believed that pilgrimages to Mecca bred fanaticism and indolence; they discouraged departures and granted few passports with which to undertake the journey.

⁵¹ In 1903, the expenditures on Muslims were the lowest: 0.07 francs per person; on Catholics: 2.93 and on Protestants: 11.08 francs.

Finally, the Koran schools dependent upon the *zawias*⁵² were severely repressed, while tribal schools were simply tolerated, and one could not count more than three official *madrasas*⁵³ created to provide for religious personnel and to secure justice for Muslims. Such was the ensemble of principles of tolerance that the Republic advocated. Islam was thus subject to the total and unrestrained control of the Administration. Only the southern and Mzab populations enjoyed a regime somewhat more liberal: as their *habous* and their properties had been respected, the *zawias* and their schools consequently were financially more sound.

8. *Laïcité's* Legacy in the Division of Contemporary Algerian Society

A study of the effects of the Republican policies of *laïcisation* will provide a partial explanation of the division of Algerians leading up to the struggle for liberation, and to the present political and religious situations. Colonial policies, which had been aggressively imposed in the North, were strongly linked to the French expropriation of Algerian territory. During colonization, the deculturation of the majority of the population was accompanied by the rise of a small class of local Europeanized elites. Language played an important role in this context. Instruction in Arabic was reduced to several private schools which were weakly supported by the State. Gradually, Arabic gave way to French as the *lingua franca* of literate Algerians. The absence of education for the vast majority of Muslims, deprived of an education in Arabic, and only meagerly educated in French, created a vast majority of Algerians illiterate both in Arabic and in French.

On the high plateau, the colonial cultural policies were enforced less aggressively. The relative absence of French allowed Arabic to survive and the Muslim culture to subsist. The Arab-speaking elites of the high plateau were linked to the *Ulamas*⁵⁴ and trained in Islamic universities of Zitouna in Tunisia and El-Azhar in Egypt. Consequently, they would maintain their cultural exchanges

52 In Algeria a *Zawias*, was a religious Islamic institution where people studied Islamic law and theology and Arabic scholarly writing (calligraphy). It was often located near the tomb of a venerated personality.

53 In Muslim countries a *madrasa* was and still is a college, or university administered by the religious authority.

54 In Algeria an *Ulama* was a doctor of Islamic Law, a jurist, a theologian, and the holder of religious and scientific knowledge.

with a variety of Arab countries of the Middle East, not only Egypt, but also, for example, Saudi Arabia.

The impact of colonization on the diverse regions of Algeria determined the manner in which Algerians, whether in the North or the South, would form their opposition to the colonial and *laïc* Republic. In northern Algeria, it was in the urban cores of the colonial cities and among the immigrant Algerians in France that the first struggles against colonial power began. Originally linked to the Algerian proletariat, these social and economic struggles were in part supported by the French socialist and communist unions. They would rapidly become overly politicized and soon separate themselves from the European Communist movement. The common social dimension would, however, remain.

The new "Star of the African North" Party, created under the direction of Messali Hadji in 1926, which would become the Party of the People in 1936, the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties in 1945, and finally in 1954, the FLN *Front National de Libération* (National Liberation Front) was resolutely populist. Its basic principle, the independence of Algeria and its separation from France, was political. After 1936, but above all after 1945, the first Algerian intellectuals, high school and university students would join the Independence movement. In 1954, they formed the UGMA which would become, following Independence, the crucible within which cadres of Algerians would be trained for the development of the country. After the beginning of the war for independence, they were sent to Eastern and Central European countries to complete their studies in technical and scientific disciplines. These intellectuals, the majority of whom were francophones, were often accused by the Arab intellectuals of the high plateau region of "being alienated," which was to say, "westernized."

On the plateau, another colonial resistance, one quite distinct from that of the North, took shape at the same time. This resistance was founded on social and cultural premises rather than on the striving for independence. This "Algerian Muslim Reform Movement" of the *Ulamas* was the principal competitor to the Independence party of the North. It demanded primarily that the French state respect Algerian's Arab/Muslim identity/culture and was only secondarily concerned with the question of independence. Its platform was educational and religious: education in Arabic, autonomy of the Koran law, and control of the media. The political militants from the North accused the elite from the high plateau both of not warming to the project of Independence, and of collaborating with the colonial power. Meanwhile, the Arabic-speaking intellectuals from the South had haughty attitudes, at best condescending and at worst scornful, toward members of the Independence movement, whom they judged to be ignorant and uncultured. For these intellectuals, the importance of the religious and cultural dimension of the resistance to colonization was uppermost.

In part because of the repressive policies of the colonial power, members of the Independence movement gave a political dimension to their platform while the *Lamas* looked into the cultural question. The two resistance movements remained bound up with their founding principles. The northern Independence movement sought political independence through all available means, while the Arabic-speaking intellectuals of the plateau region were primarily interested in cultural resistance.

The Independence movement became dominant after the Second World War, when decolonization was taking place on a global scale. Yet, the French colonial power resisted this trend and the FLN became engaged in an eight-year war. The party of the *Ulamas* joined in the resistance. These intellectuals, raised in a well-to-do culture of letters, remained aloof from the populism and radicalism of the FLN. They perceived those FLN members who were francophone intellectuals as being overly westernized; the rest as being ignorant, and illiterate masses. In any event, the ensemble of impressions made for a certain skepticism about the ability of the northern proponents of independence to found a politics of national scope. For their part, the Arabic-speaking intellectuals of the South recognized that the war for independence required a consensus. However, once independence was achieved, a reform of educational and social conventions would be necessary.

9. Conclusion

It is difficult to offer a conclusion to an analysis which has only recently become possible to undertake: namely, to understand the impact of colonization upon the present problems of the Third World. This is all the more true because the country of this study, Algeria, was a settler colony.

Let us consider briefly what the two movements that emerged from colonization would become under the aegis of nationalist politics after 1962. At Independence, the government wanted to be the arbiter deciding the different roles that these movements would take. In 1962, with independence newly won, *le moment politique était dépassé* (in the Hegelian sense) and almost naturally the moment went to development. Everything fed into it, both external relations and the internal dynamics of the nationalist movement. At the global level, development and *tiers-mondistes* theories were advocated for the Third World. France, in leaving, had also left behind a portfolio of large industrial and agricultural projects known as the "Constantine Plan." The new Algerian military power (composed of resistant fighting from the outside of the Algerian territory, during the war of independence) under the direction of Boumédiène, was search-

ing for legitimacy, which it had just lost in its violent repression of the underground fighters of the interior. After a short socialization period, the new military leadership became engaged in a strategy of development, which was presented at an economic level as the continuation of the struggle for liberation.

It was through this military connection that the new development policies retained the idea of a nationalist struggle. The challenge of development and of industrialization had become the battle of the managers and the engineers charged with implementing it, the militants of the new cause. These policies interested the military which, having lost its revolutionary aura, sought to defer the prickly question of legitimacy and the delicate problem of democracy. Development and the economy thus became a means of circumventing politics. These policies, meanwhile, offered the advantage of employing the engineers and scientists who had studied abroad in foreign universities in the wake of the Independence movement. In the period immediately following independence, everything was changing: new social categories were appearing and consolidating themselves, while others were just as rapidly disappearing. The same sea changes had already occurred among political, administrative, educational and social institutions, after the colonial order had been shattered during the war.

The legacy of the colonial economy included large agricultural sectors, the mining of oil and coal, and certain manufacturing industries such as textiles and feed mills. At the beginning of the 1980s, Algeria, along with Egypt, was the most industrialized region of Africa, South Africa notwithstanding. It possessed important hydrocarbon, steel, mechanical and materials processing industries. The new alliance organized around the uncontested power of the military found that income from petroleum reserves - which grew on account of new discoveries, the nationalization of the oil industry, and rising energy costs - provided the means with which to finance its policies of development.

Since the 1970s, the development strategy has expanded, touching every sector of the economy, while the pace of production, particularly industrial production, was accelerated. The "Constantine Plan" was by the late 1970s little more than a memory, one which the new technocrats dismissed with derision. The former engineers now constituted a technocracy, which a critical public opinion came to admire and trust for its successes. At the end of the 1970s, it seemed as though this alliance between the military and the technocracy would bring Algeria into the ranks of industrialized countries. However, the situation would change very rapidly after the death of Boumédiène in 1978, with the FLN deciding to launch a new economic policy.⁵⁵ Very quickly, and without serious immediate social problems or warning, development policies would

55 After 1980, President Chadli implemented a new political economy.

collapse.⁵⁶

With the passage of time, the managers and technocrats had become a social force, an instrument for the legitimization of the military. Following the death of Boumédiène, this force was blacklisted.⁵⁷ The technocrats were incapable of imposing their leadership on industrial Algeria. Instead, they depended upon the authoritarianism of the military power to impose themselves on their partners. Curiously reminiscent of the French model, they lived as the bearers of an historic mission, of a message of rationality and modernity with which to inculcate Algerian society. This image corresponded with the hegemonic Jacobin Algerian state, a state which sought to be rational and omnipotent, having as its mission the modernization of society.

In fact, this scientific and intellectual elite growing out of the Independence movement had become the ultimate supporter of French hegemony at the linguistic and cultural level. After being placed on the political blacklist, technocrats would adopt an attitude of elitist retreat which included a certain contempt for the political space which had jettisoned them, as well as a certain resentment toward the society that had failed to support their project. The new generations of engineers, trained in large numbers in eastern Europe and Algeria after decolonization, felt themselves discredited by their predecessors, who had become distant directors from the population. The crisis coming, this new layer of scientists disowned its elders. It was from their ranks that the first core group of Islamic scientists would come.

Politics had limited the actions of technocrats to the domains of economics and production. They had been shut out of cultural affairs - including education, communication, and civil law - which had been reserved for a group descending from the *Ulamas*.⁵⁸ The objective claimed by this group was to reconstruct the Arab/Muslim identity of Algeria and to recover their authentic culture, especially regarding the language and religion, which had been so mistreated by the colonizer.

The cultural goal was delegated to the Arab fraction of the former nationalist movement, derived in large part from the *Ulamas*. Everything relating to language, religion, values, patrimony, and communication was taken within the purview of this group. The competition of the two projects was supported by

56 The national societies, considered too large to be controlled by the bureaucracy, were dismantled.

57 The management was tried for swindling. Remarkable is how easily the technocrats with their experience were unseated, and the technocracy dismantled.

58 Here we remind the reader that our goal is not to study the diverse religious movements in Algeria now; excellent works have been published on this subject.

the outside world, siding with one or another protagonist. In the Arab world, one lauded and admired the rapidity with which Arab influence spread. Among Third World intellectuals who were more sensitive to the ideology of development, Algeria was taken as an example of industrialization. The technocrats would plan the economy, the Arab-speaking intellectuals undertake new campaigns to teach Arabic.

In a society emerging from 130 years of colonization, two challenges tear at its very fabric: a challenge of identity, and a challenge of economic development. The powers which practice the strategy of "divide and conquer", so often used in colonization, revive the old rivalries and aggravate the divisions in the society.⁵⁹

The *Ulamas* teaching the values of the Muslim religion, mistrusted modernist values brought by the technocrats from the west. Their preaching on authenticity, notably in the cultural and linguistic domain, took direct aim at the westernized technocrats and their alienation. These *Ulamas'* discourse ended up inculcating negative stereotypes of the generation of technocrats who had once belonged to the Independence movement. When political power turned against the technocrats, the Arab-speaking intellectual found in this group the relay to amplify its accusations. The technocrats emerged from a nationalist movement which had underestimated the questions of identity. They not only proved incapable of dialogue with the new generations of scientists but also of furnishing the wave of young Arab-speaking Algerians with jobs. By the same token, the *Ulamas*, increasingly dominated by the radicals among them, saw new leaders using their stereotypes to pursue distinct objectives and promoting different forms of struggle.

59 El-Kenz, Waast (1996) .

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