Germany’s Climate Governmentality. How Mechanisms of Governmentality and Discipline Govern Carbon Conduct
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1. Introduction

Today, the environment is everywhere. For less than ten years, it goes without saying that all individuals, the population and the State are obliged to minimize their impact on the environment, even if they would not be affected themselves by potential consequences. For almost every action, concern for its environmental impact is present. That obligation manifests itself in a myriad of ways that affect individual behavior - what Foucault identifies as power. This paper seeks to understand how, through which forms and technologies, we are subject to power in the name of climate protection in Germany. ¹ Or, if turned on its head, it analyses how the climate is governed in Germany.

The paper builds on Foucault’s notion of governmentality as developed in his lecture Security, Territory and Population at the Collège de France in 1977/78. In it, he presents a genealogy of political rationality and the modern State. The initial observations for his deliberations are the genesis of different political rationalities in Europe since the 16th century. Each political rationality or art of government, namely sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality, differ in their understanding or end of politics, as well as in their primary mechanisms of power. His lectures later inspired the whole field of governmentality studies, whose considerations are also taken into account here. A first major contribution is the development of the latest form of governmentality, which Foucault only touched upon, namely advanced liberal government or neoliberalism (Rose 1993). Further, this concept finds its translation into the field of climate politics in the notion of ecological modernization (Hajer 1995: 26-29). Methodologically, the paper analyzes the political rationality by giving particular attention to language and policy programs (Miller/Rose 1990: 4; Hajer/Versteeg 2005: 175–176; Oels 2005: 197).

¹ Climate protection or climate change prevention are understood, in this paper mainly as intents to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) or carbon emissions.
To fully grasp the omnipresence of environmental concern, the paper argues, scholars must recognize the complex interplay of the discourse images of ecological modernization, as a form of advanced liberal government, and ‘climate discipline’. While the former is present in parliamentary-legal or administrative climate governing and recognized by environmental governmentality studies (Oels 2013; Leibenath 2017), the latter often goes unnoticed (Lemke 2007: 60). Yet, the German climate governmentality executes power through both mechanisms. To show this, the paper aims to present its analysis in a nuanced way that allows the recognition of different mechanisms of power, while emphasizing the one climate governmentality they complementarily form.

Hoping to achieve this, the paper scrutinizes the German climate protection plan of fall 2019 to identify the security mechanisms through which the State seeks to govern the climate. The following part of the paper shifts its attention away from parliamentary-legal action and provides indications for the existence of disciplinary power, which constitutes another, yet interwoven, string of the climate governmentality. This is done in a mere explorative and fractional manner with the primary intention to shed light on aspects of climate politics that often go unrecognized.

The paper’s focus of interest is different from that of policy as well as discourse analyses. The former scrutinizes climate governance as a product of policymakers that can be measured in terms of its permissive- or restrictiveness (Böcher/Töller 2012; Töller 2019). The approach followed here, the reader will easily recognize, rejects to think in these terms. Scholars of discourse analysis, instead, seek to understand how reality is understood. While looking at policy programs and building on discourse images, this paper analyses particularly the rationalities and mechanisms - broadly speaking the ‘how’ - of power that govern the climate. Neither the emergence of a new policy program nor of a new discourse must necessarily change the existent mechanisms of power.

The paper’s limitation to a single country deserves a short notice. Germany stands both for a political as well as linguistic space. Policy-makers’ action remains the critical expression of political rationality, as it is shown in the respective part of the paper. Therefore, it seems appropriate to analyze the climate government exercised over Germany as a political unit. The second part of the analysis, taking Germany as a linguistic space, looks at the language used in the German discourse.

Before turning to the two mechanisms of the climate governmentality, namely security apparatuses and discipline, the following section introduces Foucault’s concept of governmentality and elaborates on the power dimension of climate politics.
2. Governmentality and King Climate?

This paper seeks to understand how power is executed over the German population in the name of climate change prevention. The first step to answer this question lies in the finding that the climate has much to do with power. This paragraph briefly introduces climate change as a social issue before turning to Foucault’s understanding of government. Building on that, three elements of his understanding of power are presented anecdotally.

What makes climate change a particularly interesting issue for governmentality studies is its natural but ultimately social character. Global warming occurs independently from humans’ understanding of it. As soon as climate change is spoken about, however, nature must be understood socially (Baldwin 2003). Moreover, it must be ‘discovered’ as a ‘political space’ that is represented in discourse as something governable (Stripple/Bulkeley 2013: 9–13; Lövbrand/Stripple 2014: 114–115). In this way, climate change stops being a mere natural phenomenon and turns into a ‘social product of discourse struggle’ about what it is and means to humanity (Oels 2005: 185). This social understanding of climate change, the discourse image, determines significantly which facets of it are visible, what is considered an appropriate reaction to it and, hence, impacts on how the climate is governed.

The paper’s second central topics are obviously government and power. Without doubt, one of Foucault’s most significant contributions was his understanding of power not as juridico-sovereignty, something possessed by the ruler and executed over the ruled. Instead, his work on biopolitics and the microphysics of power focuses on the how of power from a bottom-up or ascending perspective (Gordon 1991: 7): How do different forms of power, disregarding who or what causes them, work on the subject? Against this backdrop, Foucault describes government as the exercise of power or the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 1983: 221; Gordon 1991: 2).2

What made his understanding of power a novelty and his analytics of power particularly fertile was the rejection of the idea that power is always repressive, working through prohibitions, rejection, censure or negation (Saar 2007: 36). Instead, he identified governmentality as a productive power that produces new possibilities, it is innovative and creates competences in a broader sense. It structures the field of possible actions through incentives, inductions, seduction, making some options easier, while others become more difficult (Krasmann/Volkmer

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2 A more discursive definition of government is provided by Dean (2010: 18).

2007: 11; Bröckling/Krasmann/Lemke 2011: 5; Bröckling 2018: 35). Further, Foucault understands pastoral power to be at the origin of governmentality. Following the religious model relationship of shepherd and flock, the subject is governed in a paternalistic way to its own salvation. That ideational origin of governmentality illustrates well why this form of power is neither per se conflictive nor repressive (Saar 2007: 37).

Due to the productive character, (governmentality) power is not the antonym to freedom. Rather the opposite, the subject must be free - i.e. it must have the capacity to act and different options to choose from - to be governed by governmentality (Saar 2007: 37-38; Bröckling 2018: 35). Therefore, Foucault’s approach thought technologies of government and technologies of self-government together (Bröckling 2018: 31-32). To be governed, in this sense, always means also to govern oneself.

Returning to the aspect of climate governmentality, the governing of the climate should, hence, not be reduced to individual will or State action. Foucault did not reject juridico-sovereignty all-together but identified two additional types of government, namely discipline and governmentality. Both are further introduced in the respective parts when elements of each are identified in the governing of carbon conduct (Stripple/Bulkeley 2013: 13).

Moreover, Foucault considered power and knowledge to be strongly interlinked. Understanding power as something productive, he finds knowledge to be produced by power (Lemke 2005: 328; Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2006: 51–52). Parallelly, it is knowledge that renders reality thinkable, impacts how it is socially understood and affects power through what it finds to be the truth (Miller/Rose 1990: 3). This yields significant relevance to environmental experts and scientists (Luke 1999: 133–142; Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2006: 52). Interestingly, the social understanding of climate change was one of the major concerns for the German March for Science (2019) demonstrations that feared that their results - what is established as truth - would not find sufficient recognition and political application.

Obviously, the climate does not execute power in a king-like manner. However, the three issues of climate conduct, resistance, and architecture illustrate that climate change has a lot to do with power and government. First, climate change policies seek, in several ways, to affect human behavior so that the overall emission of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) is reduced. Conforming with Foucault’s notion of power execution as action on action, the way the climate is governed in Germany ultimately targets human behavior or ‘carbon conduct’ (Stripple/Bulkeley 2013: 13). This can be found in the omnipresence of ecological considerations in almost every individual action. Although these thoughts do not overrule the possibility of defection, they clearly affect individual decisions.
A second central element of power, for Foucault, is the presence of resistance. Interestingly, he considered counter-behavior no disprove of power, but instead its indication: ‘Where there is power, there is resistance’ (Foucault 1978: 95). Therefore, the fact that individuals reject to commit to the climate governmentality strengthens the plausibility of power in the name of climate change. Without the existence of power, actions such as the denunciation of climate politics as ideology by the AfD’s leader Weidel (2019) or the reframing of climate protection policies as a threat to freedom, could not be recognized as resistance to anything (Gauland, August 12, 2018; Zittelmann, October 04, 2019; Stäbler, November 19, 2019).

A third hint at power in the name of climate is physically visible in contemporary architecture. Rose and Miller (1992: 184) state that construction design is influenced by power relations while also reiterating them. It is not absurd to see architecture as a manifestation of power (relations). Without doubt, energy efficiency became one of today’s main criteria of a ‘good’ house with the passive house as the archetype. Furthermore, the spread of photovoltaic system on public and private buildings visibly manifests and materializes the importance to save energy and of environmental consciousness.

Concluding, this chapter illustrates that climate change, despite being a phenomenon of nature, is ultimately understood socially. Based on Foucault’s notion of government and knowledge-power, the references to behavior, resistance as well as architecture show that it is appropriate to analyze climate protection in terms of power.

3. Climate Governmentality and Climate Discipline

In his lecture, that Foucault would have called the history of governmentality retrospectively, he discovers sovereignty, discipline and governmentality as three broad concepts that contain their own political rationalities as well as mechanisms of power. Political rationality refers mainly to the respective purpose and end of government while the latter describes how power is exercised (Rose/Miller 1992: 175). Following the research question, the paper focuses on the different mechanisms of power. Generally, Foucault (2009: 107–108) emphasizes that sovereignty, discipline and governmentality, as mechanism of power, do not mark historical eras. While the latter is clearly identified as the latest and we can expect to find that form of government in this case, the other two did not disappear. Instead, they were incorporated to form part of an overarching governmentality configuration, consisting of security apparatuses, discipline
and sovereignty. One should expect to find these technologies of government to be applied and arranged in a way that they form one governmentality.

This section introduces Foucault’s idea of governmentality and security apparatuses as rationality and means of government. Secondly, it presents disciplinary power and the idea of ‘climate discipline’. Both will serve as key concepts for the analysis in the subsequent section.

3.1 The Idea of Climate Governmentality

Governmentality, Foucault (ibid.: 8, 108) remarks, exercises power that targets the population, bases its decisions on political economy and applies apparatuses of security as its primary technology of government. Firstly, today’s political rationality targets the population in the sense that it neither addresses parts of the population only nor subunits which would make it up and considers the population as the end to politics. At the same time, governmentality aims to conduct the conduct of each person individually, like a shepherd would guide the individual animal while keeping the whole flock in sight. Secondly, the application of political economy refers to the necessity of procedures of notation as well as collecting and presenting statistics to address phenomena that only the population, not its subunits or individuals, can show (ibid.: 104, 107). Thirdly, and most relevant for this analysis, governmentality has apparatuses of security as its main instrument. Such are described as ‘responding to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds - nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it’ (ibid.: 47). Further, security considers interventions in terms of cost-benefit efficiency, it identifies risk-groups and calculates the individual risk (ibid.: 61–62). Instead of taking an ideal as the pursued norm, as discipline would do, security apparatuses calculate an optimal average and define a ‘bandwidth of the acceptable’ on the basis of the status quo (ibid.: 6).

Since the end of the World War II, Foucault identified a new sub-type of governmentality that he called neoliberalism and which was further developed by governmentality scholars as advanced liberal government (Miller/Rose 1990; Rose/Miller 1992; Rose 1993; Dean 2010). While under liberalism, the preceding type of governmentality, the individual preference was understood as something unknowable and therefore to be left untouched, advanced liberal government tries to shape and instrumentalize the free subject (Gordon 1991: 43; Rose 1993: 294; Dean 2010: 193). Whereas the market was previously considered something natural that was

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3 In the case of climate change, this is perfectly illustrated by the prominent warming stripes, invented by climate scientist Hawkins in 2018. They show the development of the global average temperature since 1850, which, obviously, cannot be observed but only calculated. Further, models of carbon flows that illustrate this aspect are analyzed by Lövbrand and Stripple (2011).

To be protected from State intervention, it now needed to be politically created (Gordon 1991: 41). It further led to increased marketization, monetarization and implementation of regimes of accounting and financial management (Rose 1993: 295). Dean (2010: 196–198), moreover, recognized what he calls technologies of agency and technologies of performance. While the former seeks to enhance the possibility of agency, particularly for at risk-groups, the latter contains elements of benchmarking and auditing to restore trust and some level of control over the government ‘at arms distance’. Hence, advanced liberal government voids the traditional public-private divide.

In the field of climate change politics, advanced liberal government is realized in image of ecological modernization (Oels 2005: 199). Having emerged in the 1980s, this discourse image conceives climate change primarily in economic terms (Hajer 1995: 25; Oels 2005: 195–196). On the micro-economic level, it understands GHG reduction to be a reasonable measure of prevention compared to more expensive adaptation to climate change. Secondly, it sees nature as a macro-economic resource. Thirdly, it builds its policy on the population’s conviction that climate change is real and should be acted against (Hajer 1995: 26–29, 149). Derived from its strong economic perspective, ecological modernization focuses on low carbon development opportunities and yields great importance to the carbon market (Bäckstrand/Lövbrand 2019: 525–526). Ecological modernization does not see climate protection and economic growth as contradictory.

Of course, competing discourse images were identified by scholars. However, some of them, such as green governmentality and radical civic environmentalism are found to be less relevant nowadays (Luke 1999: 122; Rutherford 1999: 58). Other studies develop discourse images that did not affect the general ‘how’ of climate government, such as climate apocalypse (Oels 2013).

3.2 The Idea of Climate Discipline

Foucault speaks about discipline as a political rationality as well as a mechanism to exercise power. Because this paper seeks to understand the ‘how’ of climate government, the focus lies on discipline as a mechanism. In his lecture, Foucault finds it to be marked by (1) a strong focus on the ideal norm, (2) a binary code of the obligatory and the forbidden, (3) its centripetal tendency as well as (4) its application of dressage, surveillance and correction.

Regarding the question of (1) norm, discipline shows a significantly different approach than security. While security starts from reality, considering it to be the ‘normal’, and derives the optimal possible from it, discipline does exactly the opposite. It takes the norm as its starting
point and tries to assimilate reality to the norm. The ‘normal’ refers to reality’s compliance with the norm. The abnormal, in contrast, is reality that is unable to comply with the norm (Foucault 2009: 63). In this sense, the norm is supreme to reality (ibid.: 57). The norm is itself derived from a definitive end to politics for which to achieve things, including people, must be arranged wisely (ibid.: 99).

Further, discipline is characterized by (2) a binary code of the obligatory and the forbidden. Foucault (ibid.: 46) sees that to be an enhancement of sovereign power’s primary focus to forbid, discipline now prescribes the obligatory to reach the norm. Further, wisdom, as ‘the knowledge of things’, is necessary to develop this code (ibid.: 100). This distinguishes discipline from sovereignty as well as security. For the former, knowledge of natural law was necessary to rule the territory accordingly, while knowledge in the form of political economy, with its focus on statistics and financialization, replaced political science and natural law for security. This allowed governmentality to place knowledge on the particular subject outside the governing institution, as opposed to disciplinary power, for which the binary code requires such knowledge to be placed within the disciplining institution.

Another feature of discipline is its (3) centripetal tendency of singling out ‘spaces in which its power (…) will function fully and without limit’ (ibid.: 44–45, 56). Contrary to governmentality, which includes a myriad of aspects in its considerations, discipline exercises power with regard to an isolated policy field that is disconnected from others. This can also be found on the side of the subjects which are, too, disciplined individually with no regard to their position within society, unlike governmentality that targets the whole population through the individual (ibid.: 12). The combination of the centripetal tendency and discipline’s binary logic leads to a construction in which even the ‘small things (…) must not be abandoned to themselves’ but fall under the same binary code (ibid.: 45). This leads to a strong moralization of conduct in which even minor violations of the code are considered a complete breach of it. While security “‘lets things happen’”, discipline scrutinizes them ‘with all the more care for it being small’ (ibid.: 45).

Finally, discipline applies (4) technologies of dressage, surveillance and correction. It is through training, supervision, checks, inspections as well as punishment that human behavior is made to comply with the norm (ibid.: 4, 57). This is made possible by a massive administrative apparatus and vast policing (ibid.: 100).
4. Climate Governmentality and Discipline in Germany

Building on that conceptual groundwork, this section, firstly, discusses the 2019 climate protection law. Secondly, it looks beyond parliamentary-legal action and illustrates that mechanisms of climate discipline can be found in the discourse created by German science journalism. What the analysis renders visible is the coexistence of both, governmentality as well as disciplinary technologies of government.

4.1 Analysis of the German 2019 Climate Protection Plan

Prior to the analysis, a reflective question is due: Why should governmentality studies focus on State action, especially in its most institutionalized aggregate condition as law, given Foucault’s explicit critique that governmentality does represent a state theory (Lemke 2007)? Although the paper itself criticizes that some governmentality studies seem to focus on State action in a mere programmatic, uncritical way, there is a case for doing so.

As described above, power in the form of governmentality works through strategies of incentivizing, seduction and other productive strategies. In the German context, the administrative State is the actor that is most likely capable of intentionally applying such strategies, and its actions, like the climate protection plan, are explicitly trying to that. It is for this reason that the paper starts its analysis with State action.

By the end of 2019, the German Government and parliament agreed on measures to govern GHG emissions in form of the Climate Action Law and first measures of the Climate Action Program 2030. Its core elements are the following (Appunn/Wettengel 2019; Eddy, September 20, 2019; Tagesschau.de, December 19, 2019):

- Enshrining internationally made GHG reduction pledges into national law
  - As announced in Paris 2015, to reduce the national GHG emission by 55 % by 2030 in relation to 1990
  - As announced in New York, September 2019, to become carbon neutral by 2050
- Agreement on sectoral reduction targets for energy, buildings, transportation, industry, agriculture, waste and other with the individual ministries being responsible for their achievement
  - In case sectorial targets are missed
    - Ministries must buy emission certificates under the EU Effort Sharing Regulation from other member states
    - Ministries must present emergency programs
Annual reports on the progress are published

- Agreement on the constitution of a five-persons expert council that comments on the annual reports
- Agreement on a fee on GHG emission in transportation and heating
- Subsidies for electric cars and energy-efficient heaters and ban on oil-burning furnaces
- Reduction of VAT on train tickets

These measures cohere clearly with the logic of security, it applies technologies of agency and performance and steers through monetary incentives. To begin with the Paris pledge as well as the commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050, it is evident that this follows the logic of security apparatuses. The Paris Climate agreement has the national emissions as by 1990 as its reference point. This resonates security because it takes the status quo as the normal instead of a normative ideal, as discipline would (Foucault 2009: 36). Further, both targets grant a ten- and thirty-years’ time span. This reflects security’s idea of an acceptable bandwidth, as well as what Foucault calls the centrifugalism of it, namely that security apparatuses constantly integrate further considerations (ibid.: 45). The transition period is not granted because climate action would not be urgent, but because it would harm the national social and economic development, making a more urgent transition too costly (Tagesschau.de 2019).

The second major feature of the recent law are the sectoral national targets that are to be achieved by the individual ministries combined with the annual monitoring reports. This perfectly reflects Dean’s idea of technologies of performance, namely benchmarking and audits. Originally, Dean understood them to be applied to the population whereas, in this case, it is applied to the administrative State. However, it does not void this finding but rather shows the application of economic instruments on the State itself, a feature that Gordon (1991: 43) finds to be typical to advanced liberal government.

The annual reports will be assessed by the new expert panel. The State creates an expert commission outside its formal structure. This dynamic is itself a feature of advanced liberal government (Rose 1993: 295), while also bearing the notion of an expert audit for the State’s conduct, evoking Dean’s technology of performance. On an abstract level, the State creates a particular knowledge institution and tasks it with the assessment of state performance which, in return, allows the State to have its measures ‘expert-certified’ and to restore trust.

A further aspect regarding the sectoral targets is the obligation to buy emission certificates in case targets are failed. This serves as an archetypical example for monetarization in advanced liberal government. The gap between the actual and obliged GHG emission reductions, a sum
of CO2 tons equivalent becomes a financial sum that is to be paid for compensation. It further fulfils security’s centrifugal tendency to consider a ‘bigger picture’ in which failure in one sector can be compensated by increased GHG reductions in another.

Thirdly, several individual measures, such as the GHG fee or cheaper train tickets, create monetary incentives or disincentives to act in a more climate-friendly way. Recalling governmentality’s tendency to work through the free subject, the latest climate action law perfectly shows this pattern. Interestingly, this was explicitly emphasized during the respective press conference, in which chancellor and ministers expressed their will to enable people to change their behavior and to achieve climate protection with the citizens (Tagesschau.de 2019).

Further, none of the measures or statements made at the press conference point at the incompatibility of economic growth or consumption and climate protection. Although ‘change of behavior’ is mentioned, this referred rather to consuming differentially not less (Tagesschau.de 2019). Therefore, the climate action law as well as the climate action program show rule by advanced liberal government and stick to the idea of ecological modernization.

Nonetheless, some of the laws’ features hint at a disciplinary logic. This refers to the setting of GHG emission targets on the sectoral level, the new rhetorical emphasize on regulatory law and, to a lesser extent, the goal of carbon neutrality. Primarily, to set national sectorial targets reflects discipline’s tendency to break things down into smaller units to control them better, what Foucault describes as centripetal (Foucault 2009: 44–45). It further resonates discipline’s approach of central managing or steering of the State like a ship. Secondly, the press conference of the law saw a surging reference to regulatory law (‘Ordnungsrecht’) which would more strictly forbid or narrow the use of GHG-intensive operations (Tagesschau.de 2019; Bundesregierung 2019; DW.com, September 29, 2019; Deutscher Naturschutzbund 2019). Tellingly, the German word ‘Ordnungsrecht’ is formally referred to as ‘Polizei- und Ordnungsrecht’. The application of the police – in the broader sense of cameralism – is typical to disciplinary power. Therefore, this element might, too, be understood as a hint to disciplinary mechanisms of government. However, besides the decided ban of oil-burning furnaces, this is not reflected in actual decisions. Thirdly, the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 appears as a typical disciplinary norm at first sight. Nonetheless, this impression is partially misleading although to the figure zero creates the impression of an ultimate ideal. Instead, the thirty years that are foreseen to reach that state turn it into more of a ‘realistic’ optimum that orients itself on the status quo and provides a bandwidth of the acceptable, in terms of time.

So far, this section presents how the legal, administrative climate action measures stick to the logic of advanced liberal government and uphold ecological modernization by applying
security apparatuses. Following this logic, the climate is regulated *with or through* the citizen, a subject who is free to choose between different options. This paper argues, this freedom is dialectically filled with and hence governed by climate discipline that other state-focused governmentality studies do not focus on (see Oels 2013; Leibenath 2017).

4.2 Disciplined Climate Conduct?
The previous section showed how the climate protection plan mainly applies apparatuses of security to govern the conduct of the administrative State itself and the population. To understand how the individual, carbon-emitting subject is governed in their everyday affairs, however, one needs to look beyond administrative action, this paper argues. Focusing on the climate discourse produced under the title of science journalism, this section identifies several characteristics of disciplinary power which link with aspects of governmentality. The following scrutinizes the presented norm, the binary code of prescription, its moralization as well as the focus on the ‘small things’. What can hardly be found, however, are elements of dressage and surveillance.

Recalling the knowledge-power nexus, this analysis focuses strongly on ‘science’, though, not as a unitary actor, but as a certain center of climate discipline. Since their findings do not reach the wider public automatically, science journalism is assumed to function as its mouthpiece and display.

The norm presented by science journalism and from which its binary code is derived could be regarded as something like zero personal carbon emissions (Quarks 2018a). This is rarely made explicit and, in some cases, rather depicted as a plea to reduce personal GHG emission as much as individually possible (Tertilt 2019). Nonetheless, none of the statements refer to an acceptable level of carbon emissions that would not require further improvement. Therefore, the at least implicit existence of a norm in the sense of disciplinary power should be confirmed.

For practical reasons, however, this norm cannot be met by people living and consuming in Germany (Quarks 2018a). Except for unpractical and obscurely ‘alternative’ forms of living, public infrastructure, products of daily consumption and others make it impossible for the individual to not be somehow responsible for a certain among of GHG emissions. Resembling Bröckling’s (2016: 196) entrepreneurial self, the zero-carbon emitting subject remains a ‘real fiction’. The fact that this norm cannot be reached does not undermine it, as one might expect. Quite the opposite, the effectiveness of the disciplinary mechanism identified in this section depends on it requiring continuous optimization and self-examination.
A further element of disciplinary power which is set up in the discourse of science journalism is the very explicit and thorough prescription of the obligatory and the forbidden. Usually, science journalism describes them as recommendations only, although they should rather be understood as prescriptions. Because failure to stick to these ‘recommendations’ is presented as truly harmful, it becomes obligatory to follow them and to do ‘the right thing’. This is closely related to the previous aspect of the real-fictitious norm. Because the norm exists but it is very hard to reach, every personal decision and (non-)action must continually be scrutinized for its carbon conduct.

In the same logic, the frequent presentation of ‘what each one of us can do’ strengthens the individualization of climate protection, since these prescriptions are directed at individuals. The most prominent demands expressed through science journalism are the avoidance of flying, especially continental flights, or at least to compensate GHG emissions, the prescription of vegetarian or vegan nutrition habits, and the forbidding of heavy cars in favor of public transport, electric cars or carpooling (Quarks 2018b, 2018d, 2019b, 2019c; ZDFZeit 2020).

Regarding language, the common reference to the forbidden things as ‘climate sins’ (Klimasünde) expresses the morality of the code. This is further iterated through the language of flight shaming (Flugscham) or SUV shaming (Britz, September 11, 2019; Quarks 2018b, 2018c; Gerhard 2019; Welt 2019). This language of shame, sin and morality suggests each breach of the prescribed to be evil. What is considered less relevant, here, is whether an individual compensates their GHG emissions of flying, SUV-driving or meat consumption in another field, as security would do.

Interestingly, these prescriptions are not relativized according to the subject’s condition, as one would expect from pastoral power-inspired governmentality. Conditions such as having family abroad or studying abroad and other personal factors, are not taken into account. It is for this reason, that I understand this aspect to rather speak to discipline’s focus on binary norms, instead of following the example of pastoral power guiding the subject with regard to their particular situation.

Further, even the focus on ‘small things’ is present in this discourse. Prescriptions made by ZDFZeit (2020), for example, go as far as using a lid when cooking with a pot, installing water-saving showerheads or turning electric devices off instead of keeping them in the standby

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4 This aspect is especially interesting because the idea of compensation complies strongly with security’s thinking that negative effects could be balanced with positive outcomes in another field to keep the overall risk contained. What is shown here, instead, is the obligation to make use of this possibility, what in turn, can be seen as part of disciplinary’s binary code.
mode. Despite it being evident that these measures will not impact the trajectory of global GHG emissions significantly, every action is normed in a way that its CO2 output is minimal. Interestingly, this element of a disciplinary mechanism appears to be linked up with governmentality’s centrifugal tendency to take all aspects of life into consideration, and to have a wholistic perspective. The prescriptions go into very fine details, but they do so without narrowing the focus down on particular fields of everyday activities. Instead, the prescriptions cover a very broad range of aspects of life, as the examples given above show. It seems, therefore, that the disciplinary and governmentality mechanisms are arranged in a way that forms an overall governmentality that is centripetal and centrifugal at the same time.

Finally, what cannot be found in the discourse are significant elements of dressage, surveillance and control. The only element, in this regard, seems to be (weak) social stigmatization that manifests itself in ideas such as flight or SUV shaming. However, if one understands the principles of this norm to be already internalized, the self-conduct by ‘fear of deviance and immorality’ could serve as an alternative technology ensuring compliance to climate discipline (Fletcher 2010: 173). To follow up on the assumption, it might be valuable to study relevant elements of climate dressage trained in kindergartens, schools and other institutions of education.

To conclude, what these explorative and fragmented observations render plausible is the existence of aspects of disciplinary mechanisms as well as governmentality mechanisms in the contemporary climate governmentality. What becomes visible is a certain emphasis on reducing individual consumption that partially challenges the discourse of ecological modernization (Quarks 2018c). Of course, the findings must not be misunderstood as a presentation of a scientific government that speaks through science journalism and intentionally applies disciplinary power like cameralism in the 18th century. This is clearly not the case.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Several times in his lecture, Foucault emphasizes that one should not misunderstand the different political rationalities to be ascribed to different historical eras. Instead, he speaks of the ‘triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality’ that would, now, simultaneously and complementarily govern the population (Foucault 2009: 8, 107–108). In this logic, this paper identifies and illustrates mechanisms of governmentality and discipline to be at work in the German climate government.
One ambition of the paper is to look beyond actions of the administrative State. To some extent, the analysis of the discourse produced by science journalism tried to do this. In the concluding section, a further problematization of this distinction is due. Of course, the analysis went beyond parliamentary-legal or administrative-executive action. However, the producers of science journalism discussed in this issue, namely the ZDF and Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), are funded publicly and do have civil-political oversight bodies. The idea here is not to reduce the idea of the state to political budget plans, but to say that even in such narrow understandings, drawing a line is far less easy than it sounds, and it might be equally meaningless. Instead, it is more revealing to think both mechanisms together, as they seem to dialectically induce each other. The disciplinary mechanisms draw much of their significance from the widely-shared assumption that the governmentality mechanisms of the climate protection plan have been insufficient so far (Sax 2019; Quarks 2019a). In this sense, the un-binding or uncompulsory nature of advanced liberal government partially allows for the very prescriptive disciplinary mechanisms in the climate government. At the same time, advanced liberal government and ecological modernization depend on the population’s conviction that climate protection is crucial.

Concluding, this paper shows, firstly, that Foucault’s analytics of power and governmentality allow identifying the climate as powerful in the sense that power is applied in the name of climate protection. This is made visible, first of all, by its decentralized understanding of power that can be identified even without a unitary source. As this paper shows, part of this power can be traced back to parliamentary-legal action, mainly following the logic of apparatuses of security, governing in the form of advanced liberal government. However, the limitation to State programs misses a significant share of the climate government. Mechanisms of disciplinary power are illustrated to exist in the discourse produced by science journalism. Only the recognition of both interconnected mechanism of power, ecological modernization and climate discipline can explain today’s omnipresence of environmental concern in individual carbon conduct in Germany.
References


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Die Working Paper werden auf der Website des Instituts für Politikwissenschaft (https://www.uni-bremen.de/ipw/) veröffentlicht. Für weitere Informationen steht Dr. Caterina Bonora (cbonora@uni-bremen.de), Geschäftsführerin des Instituts für Politikwissenschaft, gerne zur Verfügung.