Call for Papers

China’s climate cooperation with the Global South

Online Workshop - November 27th, 2024

Institute of Intercultural and International Studies (InIIS), University of Bremen

Bremen, Germany

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Loss and Damage Fund, adopted at the Conference of the Parties (COP27) in 2022, is lauded by some as a breakthrough agreement to mitigate the impact of climate change and related natural disasters on vulnerable countries. However, China, the world's largest CO2 emitter, is abstaining from contributing to this fund, which, like all global climate finance, is voluntary. Despite widespread criticism arguing for moral responsibility and calls upon China to live up to its important position in the world, China argues from a position where it is itself a developing country that is severely affected by natural disasters.

Yet, while abstaining from contributing to multilateral funding schemes, China has actively engaged with the global South on climate action and contributed to the loss and damage agenda via various alternative channels. For instance, China created institutional frameworks under the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund, pledging 20 billion RMB/ 3.1 billion USD to address issues of food security and infrastructure provision. Other examples include climate mitigation and adaptation projects, ranging from renewable energy projects to trainings, technology transfer as well as or disaster relief assistance. However, provision through Chinese alternative channels is not always successful. Reasons include domestic issues of inter-ministerial coordination but also transparency issues that inhibit project evaluation to measure their actual impact.

While “loss and damage” is an emerging but still recent topic in global climate governance, little is known with regards to Chinese alternative modes of cooperation with the Global South and beyond the frameworks of multilateral fora.

Against this background, we are inviting contributions for an online workshop to discuss issues related to, but not limited to, the following topics:

• China contributes to loss and damage, climate change mitigation and adaptation through alternative financing channels. As loss and damage only occurs when both adaptation and mitigation efforts are unsuccessful, what is China doing to help address loss and damage through alternative bilateral, regional or international channels, and what specific cases could you compare to the 90 million USD that China has provided to flood-hit Pakistan in 2022? Do/how do these cases fit in China’s bilateral initiatives under the South-South Cooperation Fund?

• China is pursuing specific political and economic interests and objectives with its climate cooperation with the Global South. What are China’s interests in contributing via alternative channels, is China achieving its objectives through these projects? To what extent do Chinese and local interests diverge and converge in cases where China contributes to the global loss and damage agenda?
• There are not only economic but also political dimensions to China's contribution to the global loss and damage agenda via alternative channels. What are the political dimensions of China contributing or not contributing to the UNFCCC Loss and Damage Fund, and what are the implications of China continuing to contribute through its own channels? To what extent do China's contributions (via the UNFCCC Fund or its own channels) have a positive reputational impact on its international climate leadership?
• China's slow distribution of funds in its South-South Cooperation Fund can be partially ascribed to challenges in domestic policy coordination. This stems from the complex inter-ministerial collaboration necessary for project execution, along with the centralization of international development duties under the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). What is the domestic political and institutional environment for China's contributions to the loss and damage agenda and climate cooperation with the Global South in general? What are institutional features and barriers to providing contributions?
• China is working with other international actors, such as the EU and Germany, in their engagement with third countries in the Global South. How are they working together to jointly advance the global agenda on loss and damage? What are the prospects for China and the EU to jointly contribute to loss and damage payments or technical cooperation on loss and damage, e.g., risk assessment or alignment of aid payments? Are the EU and China cooperating or competing on projects related to the loss and damage agenda in the Global South, and if so, how and why?
• China interprets the concept of loss and damage under its South-South Cooperation Fund in a way that may differ from the interpretation of the UNFCCC. How does China interpret loss and damage? How does China interpret the concept in comparison to other global actors and the UNFCCC? What motives does China pursue compared to other global contributors, such as the EU? Based on this interpretation, how do Chinese approaches in host countries differ from those of other actors?

We invite researchers to submit paper abstracts of approximately 300 words, including authors names and affiliation to pongratz@uni-bremen.de, by August 25th, 2024. Abstracts should reflect original research which has not been published elsewhere and include the main research question, (tentative) findings, the methodological approach and contributions. We will inform authors about acceptance by September 5th, 2024.

The online workshop will take place on November 27th, 2024.  We are looking forward to receiving paper drafts by November 13th, 2024. We are seeking to publish individual papers in a Special Issue of a peer-reviewed political science or environmental policy journal, or in an edited volume.

For any question, please feel free to get in touch with Barbara Pongratz (pongratzprotect me ?!uni-bremenprotect me ?!.de).

Wiebke Rabe (Assistant Professor of International Relations, InIIS, University of Bremen) & Barbara Pongratz (Research Associate, InIIS, University of Bremen)